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Abstract 
Poststructuralist accounts of gender provide a useful theoretical space to unpack the workings of power 
and domination as they structure the organization of our language, representations, concepts, and 
discourse in general.  One significant flaw of this theory is a failure to adequately account for the social 
realm of embodied individuals, social interactions, and interpretive moments.  In this paper, I offer 
conventional femininity as a particular type of gendered habitus that highlights this theoretical flaw as it 
necessarily links what is promising and useful about poststructuralist accounts of gender with the 
physical, social, interactive, and interpretive everyday lives of women.   
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Theoretical Discussion 
The abstracted realm of social discourse acts directly on the physical body in constitutive, 
productive, yet not entirely deterministic ways.  These two modes of existence (discursive and material) 
are so complexly embedded in each other that they cannot be understood in isolation.  That is, how 
women are represented (in images, symbolic systems, and language) and what women actually are1 (in 
body comportment, physical strength, ability to speak and act) inform each other in ways that are 
extremely difficult to untangle.  This paper will attempt to highlight the workings of discourse on the 
physical bodies of women as discussed in current feminist poststructuralist analyses.  I will in turn 
explore a critique of the privileging of the discursive realm inherent to poststructuralism as proposed by 
the material and everyday practices of women which necessarily imply interactional, interpretive, and 
social moments.  This critique of discourse presented by the material realm is, I believe, central to a 
feminist emancipatory project because it interfaces the individual‟s lived experience with macro-level 
institutionalized forces that regulate, represent, and produce subjects. 
 In turn, drawing on previous theory and research, I hope to demonstrate the cultural impositions 
of femininity as inhibitory to achieving a fully articulated subject position (both discursively and 
materially).  Sexual violence, physical force, and symbolic objectification are interrelated elements that 
must be accounted for to adequately capture the manifestation of femininity in our current cultural 
moment.  As I will argue in this paper, each element is constitutive of dominant cultural representations 
of femininity.  I use “femininity” broadly here; I mean it to represent the discursive practices or physical 
practices that allow a person to be identifiable as a woman in our current cultural moment.  By 
demonstrating the disabling effects of femininity and relating this to the removal of subject status from a 
woman‟s body, I hope to present a materialist-deconstructive feminist analysis2 in order to pose the 
theoretical possibility of what I will call a subjectified woman or “female subjectivity”.  I have posited 
here two modes of existence – the abstracted domain of social discourse and the material domain of 
women‟s bodies and everyday social practices.  I believe the possibility of female subjectivity exists at 
the intersection of these domains, in a space (the feminine body) that is the materialization of power. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This is not a reference to a biologistic, “natural” female essence or body, only a socially constructed one. 
2 I follow in the tradition of the “new” materialists like Dorothy Smith and Pierre Bourdieu who advance a much broader 
definition of materialism than the socialist-feminists of the 1970s who equated the material realm with the workings of the 
political economy and the mode of production (Mann, 2010; Gimenez, 2000).  This “new” definition of materialism encompasses 
cultural practices such as speech, dress, body comportment, and interactions with others as acting in concert with the economy 
and production in order to generate the social structure of sustained inequality. 
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Recognizing Women 
 To be clear, I will be speaking only to the femininity that produces white, middle-class, 
heterosexual, gender-conforming3 women‟s bodies in the United States during the early 21st century.  I 
wish to emphasize that this does not at all encompass the embodied experiences of women from other 
racial or ethnic backgrounds or social classes within contemporary American culture nor does it address 
the embodied experiences of women in different historical periods or geographic locations.  By focusing 
my analysis within the U.S., and recognizing that gender is certainly not the only way bodies are 
characterized, I wish to highlight gender without prioritizing it (see Bettie, 2003:41 for this position on 
class). That is, I wish to strategically foreground gender to better understand what it means to propose a 
gendered subjectivity (social agency for women thusly situated).  The femininity described here is a 
specific kind gender habitus4 (Bourdieu, 1990); one which is privileged by race, class, sexuality and 
global location, but does not acknowledge these dimensions of its construction.    I justify this position 
(and will refer to “women” throughout this paper rather than to “white, middle-class, heterosexual, 
gender-conforming, First-World women”) with Ann Cahill‟s (2000) important observation that this is the 
standard by which all women‟s bodies are monitored and disciplined5 and the fact that this particular 
gender habitus has the power to regulate and to discipline all other femininities by claiming universal or 
abstract femininity.  I do this not to erase the experiences of the many women who do not fall into the 
narrow, produced and unstable category of “white and middle-class”; I wish only to foreground the power 
that this “emphasized” or “conventional” femininity (Connell, 1987: 183-188) wields over all women6.  
                                                          
3 My definition of femininity requires that women conform to conventional gender practices within the context of 
heterosexuality.  On this point, Chrys Ingraham (1994) writes, “Ask students how they learn to be heterosexual, and they will 
consistently respond with stories about how they learned to be boys or girls, women or men, through various social institutions in 
their lives.  Heterosexuality serves as the unexamined organizing institution and ideology (the heterosexual imaginary) for 
gender” (p.216).  Although Ingraham‟s point is to separate out these two levels of analysis (gender from heterosexuality), I rely 
on her demonstration of the frequent conflation of these concepts to highlight their imbrication.  
4 Lois McNay offers the following definition for this term: “Bourdieu claims that large-scale social inequalities are established 
not at the level of direct institutional discrimination but through the subtle inculcation of power relations upon the bodies and 
dispositions of individuals.  This process of corporeal inculcation is an instance of what Bourdieu calls symbolic violence or a 
form of domination which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity.  The incorporation of the social into the 
corporeal is captured by Bourdieu in the notion of habitus” (1999:99 emphases in original). 
5 “[W]omen who are excluded from this dominant class are often nevertheless defined or measured over and against this 
standard.  In certain cases, the dominance of this particular articulation of femininity serves to define women of certain ethnicities 
or classes out of their femininity (and thus, importantly, out of their very humanity)” (Cahill, 2000:51).  Highlighting the well-
established fact that femininity is always racialized (that gender is constituted racially), for my analysis, the “whiteness” implied 
in the concept of femininity is an integral part not only of what allows it to claim itself as an abstraction, but also of what marks 
the denial of subjectivity.  This is because the “othering” of this particular femininity provides the constitutive outside to 
hegemonic masculinity (which is itself imbued with unacknowledged whiteness).  Therefore, the whiteness of femininity is not 
separable from its ability to signify the (falsely universal and necessarily white) sexual object position.  In this way, as I 
understand Cahill‟s position, women who cannot claim white racial dominance are relatedly prevented from claiming femininity 
itself. 
6 For example, Gayle Rubin (1984) describes how “good”, “natural”, “normal”, “healthy” sex is highly specific and exclusionary; 
it is “heterosexual, marital, monogamous, reproductive, and non-commercial . . .  any sex that violates these norms is „bad‟, 
„abnormal‟ or „unnatural‟” (p.152).  She notes how “good” sex is privileged in religion, medicine, psychiatry, politics, law and 
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Foucault (1990 [1978]) confirms that “standard” images or ideals have much regulatory and disciplinary 
power because the image that is the standard maintains power because of its abstractness and its (false) 
claim to universality.  Images that have become standardized are imbued with this power because they 
contain specificity that masquerades as the abstract or universal.  For my purposes, the whiteness, class 
privilege, heterosexuality and privileged global location contained in images of femininity are present but 
unacknowledged parameters of the “standard” that construct and empower the concept itself.   
 Because I identify as a gender-conforming heterosexual woman who is both white and middle-
class7, my structural positions of race and class and heterosexual (and national and others) privilege are 
complexly embedded within my structural position of gendered oppression.  This limits my ability to 
speak to other dimensions of identity as I attempt to claim a theoretical space for “female subjectivity”.  
Identifying as a woman not oppressed on any other dimension of structural inequality challenges me to 
consider in what ways any development of “female subjectivity”, as I have defined it here, would be 
meaningful to women very differently situated in interacting modes of oppression, inequality, and 
exploitation.  While I acknowledge that the ramifications of my theoretical project might bear little 
significance in the lives of these women, I nonetheless maintain the importance of deconstructing the 
disabling8 effects of femininity as it confers femaleness to women otherwise privileged in that this 
analysis requires my accountability to women excluded from this privilege.     
With this, I believe that “woman” as an identity category does not require that individuals do not 
differ on other dimensions of social privilege or penalty.  On the contrary, my ability to identify as a 
woman requires that I eventually identify with (other) women (Sedgwick, 2000:51).  The as/with 
distinction reveals the reliance of each claim to identity on the other; identifying as a member of an 
identity category9 requires subsequent identity with other members of the category that are by definition 
other than me.  Any possibility of knowledge that claims to stem from shared identity then actually stems 
from difference.  Spivak clarifies this apparent inconsistency: “The position that only the subaltern can 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
other important domains.  This is a useful example of how a “standard” is imbued with regulatory power over those it excludes as 
well as those it purports to represent.  
7 Having been raised middle-class, I have the “cultural capital” (skill set, privileges and entitlements) of the middle-class which 
undoubtedly informs my position in this paper, although I wish to clarify that for my family of four, our household income is 
185% above the federal poverty line which qualifies us for the following social programs: WIC (a supplemental nutritional 
program for low-income pregnant women or mothers with young children), Medicaid, and NOLAC (free legal aid for low-
income residents of New Orleans).  Because I believe this paper to be a feminist work, I share the assumption of feminist 
methods that require the author to disclose her position in social relations because “the generator of knowledge [is] central to 
understanding that knowledge” (Hurtado, 2004 [1996]:125).  This is in purposeful opposition to Western scientific disembodied 
methods that study “others” with no acknowledgment of the knowledge producer.  
8 I define “disabling” as follows: to remove ability from, to deprive of capacity, to make incapable or ineffective (2010, Merriam-
Webster Online).   
9 This refers to strategic, not fixed, essentialism.  By foregrounding gender I necessarily evoke a group category that is 
unavoidably essentialist.  I rely here on Gayatri Spivak‟s “strategic essentialism” (Mann, 2010) which refers to a kind of 
temporary and imperfect collapsing of identity into a single dimension in order to achieve a political goal. 
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know the subaltern, only women can know women and so on, cannot be held as a theoretical 
presupposition either, for it predicates the possibility of knowledge on identity.  Whatever the political 
necessity for holding the position, and whatever the advisability of attempting to „identify‟ (with) the 
other as subject in order to know her, knowledge is made possible and sustained by irreducible difference, 
not identity” (Spivak, 1993: 8 emphasis added).  As will be discussed in more detail later, difference is a 
requisite precursor to any coherent category and the possibility of knowledge rests not on sameness but on 
difference. 
 Having clarified my ability to speak to the category of “women”, I will proceed with a theoretical 
inquiry into the violence contained within the particular construction of white, middle-class, heterosexual, 
imperial femininity.  I will be exploring this particular social location as the current hegemonic10 female 
social position, while acknowledging that it is always already raced, classed, (hetero)sexualized, and 
projected from a global position of privilege.  While indeed every act is raced, classed, gendered, and 
sexualized11, my purpose with this paper is to explore the parameters around what can be read as female 
in our current cultural moment while acknowledging that gender may be articulated differently by women 
in different race, class and sexuality (and other) locations.  Other structural dimensions of oppression 
certainly overlap and intersect producing (non-white) raced, (non-privileged) classed, and (non-hetero) 
sexualized (and others) manifestations of femininity.  These articulations are regarded as specific, in need 
of modifiers (such as “Black woman” or “working-class woman” rather than simply, “woman”) and seen 
as distinct from the falsely universal and unacknowledged privilege and dominance contained in the 
concept of femininity. 
 My definition of femininity – as that which secures for a (non)subject the cultural position of 
“woman” – excludes a certain number of persons with female bodies that are not culturally intelligible as 
women; these female-identified persons are gender non-conforming. We could call this category of 
persons “masculine women” 12 [Halberstam, 1999]) who suffer a different kind of violence (as gender 
                                                          
10 Although this is not “hegemonic” in the same way that dominant masculinity is hegemonic, the latter having been produced by 
the ruling “class” of men.  I use hegemonic femininity in the sense that it exerts power over all other femininities without explicit 
consent but instead through general consensus (Connell, 1987).    
11 In her book Bad Boys: Public Schools and the Making of Black Masculinity (2004), Ann Arnett Ferguson  notes how poor 
Black boys who do well in school are subjected to accusations of “being gay” from their peers while poor Black girls who do 
well in school are accused of “acting white”.  This points to the complex ways race, gender, sexuality and class intersect in 
everyday situations such that we cannot talk about abstracted “race” or “gender” or any other dimension of identity in any 
meaningful way.  
12 I wish to distinguish my notion of female subjectivity from Judith Halberstam‟s (1999) notion of “female masculinity”.  She 
notes how masculine women experience their masculinity as “a deep or internal identity effect” (1999: paragraph 7).  Although 
there is often a slippage from “masculinity” to embodied power, she maintains a distinction between the two.  For Halberstam, 
“[masculinity] becomes legible as masculinity where and when it leaves the white, middle-class body . . . . But all too many 
studies that currently attempt to account for the power of white masculinity recenter this white male body by concentrating all 
their analytical efforts on detailing the forms and expressions of white male dominance” (1998: 2).  For her, “masculinity” is not 
the same thing as the forms and bodily effects of white male dominance.  For her, the bodily effects of white male dominance are 
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non-conforming) than the violence doled out to what we might call feminine, discursively aligned, 
culturally appropriate women (as gender conforming).  Masculine women are culturally inappropriate 
because they threaten the social order that aligns masculinity with power and power with maleness.  They 
suffer violence because they are socially read as appropriating an embodied subject position which does 
not cohere with a female body13 (Bordo, 1993).  In other words, they have illegitimately embodied power.  
This paper will be an exploration of the possibility of a woman‟s legitimate claim to power as a culturally 
recognizable woman relative to discourse and the physical body.  I will call this possibility “female 
subjectivity”. 
 To begin, I will provide an overview of some of the major ways gender has been analyzed in the 
past (focusing on how discourse attempts to describe the physical body), illuminating contradictory views 
of gender within the history of feminism and how poststructural analyses of gender attempted to 
transcend these contradictions in contemporary gender analyses. 
 
Difference versus Sameness         
 Conservative scientific, religious, legislative and medical discourses hold that women are 
qualitatively different from men because of the nature of women‟s bodies.  That is, a woman‟s body is 
that which separates her fundamentally and without exception from the category of persons we 
understand as men14.  Currently, women‟s bodies are understood to be inherently, qualitatively different 
from men‟s bodies.  This was not always the case, as in ancient western medicine up to the Renaissance, 
accounts of female anatomy held that women were inverted or underdeveloped men.  Women were 
understood to be quite the same as men (the fully developed human specimen) so much so that some 
women could continue development outside the womb and actually turn into men (movement in the other 
direction was not possible, men could not “regress” into women) (Laqueur, 1986).  Although this 
formulation of ideas served to justify the social hierarchy of male dominance and female subordination, it 
was based on the logic of a fundamental sameness (Laqueur, 1986). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
more a description of dominance than of masculinity.  In Halberstam‟s analysis, masculinity is an expression of identity, which 
does not necessarily cohere to male bodies, whiteness, or dominance.  For my analysis, “subjectivity” is exactly those bodily 
forms and effects that express and signal dominance.  For my purposes, a subjectified woman is not a woman expressing an 
internal masculinity; it is a woman demonstrating embodied power.  In support of my viewpoint, Susan Bordo defines orthodox 
masculinity as “the subjectivity which actively defines and constitutes („penetrates‟) reality” (1993: 732), it is this kind of 
subjectivity that I refer to and I understand Halberstam‟s project to be of a wholly different kind. 
13 Importantly, gender non-conforming women are frequently subjected to both types of violence (physical violence as 
punishment to a woman illegitimately embodying power [masculinity] as well as sexual violence as punishment for what is seen 
as the denial of a woman‟s true social status and physical body [denigrated and violable]).  Femininity is enforced in two separate 
ways here – physically and sexually. 
14 For the social insistence on sexual dimorphism that is unsupported by biology, see Fausto-Sterling‟s “The Five Sexes: Why 
Male and Female are Not Enough” (1993). 
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 Interestingly, although a justification for gendered oppression has existed since Aristotle and it 
has based its evidence on anatomy, the social interpretation of this anatomy has dramatically shifted.  
That is, there has long been a logic of inequality, and it has always claimed anatomical evidence, what 
changed was what anatomy was called on to explain.  It began as evidence as to the fundamental 
sameness of men and women in a hierarchical sense (as in a true hierarchy is an account of sameness just 
lesser or greater than, quantitatively, in degrees).  It subsequently shifted to the pervasive understanding 
today that is an account of the fundamental difference between men and women.  This account cannot 
qualify as a gender hierarchy which is in fact a quantitative difference; it must be understood as radical 
gendered exclusion/expulsion (a qualitative difference).  The motivation behind this shift in interpretation 
had origins in social and political upheaval.   
The original conception of hierarchy based on sameness could not withstand the profound 
transformations of European society from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries (Laqueur, 1986).  
The Enlightenment presented a challenge to this set of ideas as “Political theorists beginning with Hobbes 
had argued that there is no basis in nature for any specific sort of authority- of a king over his people, of a 
slaveholder over a slave, nor, it followed, of a man over a woman.  There seemed no reason why the 
universalistic claims made for human liberty and equality during the Enlightenment should exclude half 
of humanity” (Laqueur, 1986:18).  This time period bore witness to the social revolutions engendered by 
this kind of thinking; it would also note that the space created for democracy and the empowering of the 
individual subject over lord and church would necessarily threaten claims to any kind of domination.  It 
was precisely at this time that it became necessary to articulate “a new model of incommensurability” 
between men and women (Laqueur, 1986:18).  This is when women became qualitatively different from 
men, as evidenced by their bodies.  Although the very term “Enlightenment” suggested a new modern era 
where the light of reason and rationality would render inoperable the superstition, traditions, and 
irrationality of the feudal premodern era or “dark ages”, the maintenance of gender inequality within a 
framework that legally recognized only the individual rights of “male citizens”15 required that women be 
deemed qualitatively different from men, especially as evidenced by their bodies under “scientific” 
scrutiny.   
Feminist reactions to this paradigm shift and concurrent reinterpretations of the body faced new 
problems – liberal ideology required a neuter body, the workings of which should be of no interest to 
legislation, labor or discourse (Laqueur, 1986).  The body was simply the vessel that contained the 
rational subject – rationality itself constituted the person (Grosz, 1994).  The “individual”, in order to 
represent the universal figure of liberal theory must be “disembodied and disembedded” (McNay, 
                                                          
15 The law defined a male citizen as a white, married, property-owning, tax-paying male of voting age (Mann, 2010). 
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1999:95).  If it were not abstracted from specific physical attributes, it would be revealed that the 
“individual” is really the raced, classed, gendered, and sexualized subject of racist, western, imperialist, 
masculinist thought.  Concepts like “individual” or “citizen” are highly exclusionary and any claim they 
might have to the idea of the universal, abstracted person undefined or uninhibited by bodily 
specifications is a political fiction (Pateman, 1986).  Although a useful political tool to argue against the 
legitimacy of discrimination, the problem to historical, liberal feminism is that the neuter body, 
unencumbered by gender effectively erases women‟s embodied experience, material reality, and 
consequently negates any basis for political mobilization16.  Liberal feminism itself (defined as the work 
which seeks for women full participatory parity – to participate as equals in discourse, language, social 
interaction, and institutions) then depends on an ideology of sameness (Laqueur, 1986:18; Fraser, 1998).  
In contrast, more radical feminist perspectives which were unwilling to erase women‟s embodied 
experiences, but rather sought to celebrate them17, depended on an ideology of gender differences (Mann, 
2010). 
 
Domination Embedded in Difference 
As an unrelenting challenge to all identity politics whose ultimate aim must be the erasure of the 
identity that mobilized political action, feminism too has struggled with the “equality in difference” 
dilemma.  Toril Moi (1988) explains that the feminism of difference is necessarily implicated in struggles 
for equality, “For the very case of equal rights rests precisely on the argument that women are already as 
valuable as men.  But given women‟s lack of equal rights, this value must be located as difference, not as 
equality: women are of equal human value in their own way” (Moi, 1988: 5 emphases in original).  In 
abstracted terms, this would translate as the specificity of women is what guarantees their access to the 
universal, as it is defined around white, middle-class, heterosexual men (Wittig, 1992).  This position, 
although politically strategic for oppressed groups, does not appear to make logical sense. 
                                                          
16 Liberal feminists did organize in this country and quite effectively too.  They were instrumental in passing much legal and 
social reform including anti-discriminatory laws as well as the public recognition that sexual harassment, battery and rape are 
social problems rather than individual ones. The problem remains, however, in how women are interpreted under existing 
frameworks that were established by men on the basis of the exclusion of women.  Explaining the process by which women can 
file charges of sexual discrimination, Catherine MacKinnon provides a useful example of this exclusion.  Women must choose 
one of the two following legal arguments: the first, the “equality rule”, offers an understanding of women as gender-neutral, 
abstract, and objective, which is in effect the male standard for men applied to women.  The second option is “benign 
discrimination” which is the view that women are in need of special protection or help.  To be a woman claiming sex 
discrimination under the law, a woman must be treated as either a man or a “lady”, “We have to meet either the male standard for 
males or the male standard for females” (1987:71).  There is, under existing law, no understanding of women as women outside 
of male domination.  Another example of the law‟s inability to accommodate women is The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1964 which although established to protect the working rights of pregnant women, this law understands pregnancy as a hybrid 
between a disability and an illness. 
17 This became the domain of spiritual feminists and cultural feminists of the second wave women‟s movement in the U.S. which 
rested on an essentialist notion of the differences between men and women (Mann, 2010).   
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Demonstrating an option out of this dilemma by incorporating a poststructuralist critique into the 
ways in which historians have framed the “equality-vs-difference” debate, Joan Scott deconstructs these 
terms, each the presumed antithesis of the other, and finds that “equality is not the elimination of 
difference and difference does not preclude equality” (1988: 38).  When these terms are paired 
dichotomously they create an impossible choice for feminism, “If one opts for equality, one is forced to 
accept the notion that difference is antithetical to it.  If one opts for difference, one admits that equality is 
unattainable” (1988: 43).  This dilemma is itself antithetical to feminism and not logically necessary.  The 
only useful response to this established arrangement of terms is to unmask the power relations that pose 
equality as the antithesis of difference and to consider the political implications that result (Scott, 1988).  
We cannot render invisible our differences (neither from men nor from each other) as this would not only 
erase our political front, but it would fail to recognize that power is constructed on the ground of 
difference and so must be contested there.  Scott recounts that the origin of the meaning of equality, as it 
is applied to social relations, is in the concept of egalitarianism: it is “a social agreement to consider 
obviously different people as equivalent (not identical) for a stated purpose” (1988:44).  The opposite of 
equality then is not difference, but inequality or inequivalence of obviously different people in a particular 
circumstance for a particular purpose.  The definition of equal persons differs from that of identical 
persons in that equal persons (the application of the political notion of equality) requires an 
acknowledgement of difference.  Scott concludes, “Equality might well be defined as deliberate 
indifference to specified differences”18 (1988: 44). The feminist assertion of “equality in difference” then 
does not suffer from an inconsistency in logic, but is instead a necessary feminist critique of falsely 
constructed binaries that preclude other ways of thinking. 
The promise of poststructuralism is that it offers a critique to both liberalism (“women are the 
same as men”) and radical feminism (“women are fundamentally different from men”).  It does so by 
suggesting that an appropriate understanding of the position of women cannot be captured within the 
confines of this debate.  Instead, poststructuralism understands that women exist as “other” to construct 
                                                          
18 Joan Scott (1988) is writing here a critique of what she sees as a current trend in theory production to rewrite all historical 
feminist struggles as inevitably having to choose from one side of the “equality-vs-difference” debate as a political strategy; she 
rejects this falsely constructed binary and its application throughout history.  Her quote I have included here could be critiqued as 
failing to analyze material differences between women which feminism must not be indifferent to.  Perhaps this could be the next 
step in Scott‟s theoretical project and not a fair critique of her analysis which was to deconstruct each term within the binary and 
demonstrate its social and not inevitable formulation. A useful extension of her work would be to propose how feminism might 
understand how women who are differently situated might be able to claim equality as it is defined as “deliberate indifference to 
specified differences”, that is not indifferent to all differences, especially not the effects of inequality.  If power and dominance 
are constructed on the ground of difference, we must be careful to recognize when differences are used to oppress, exclude and 
exploit.  Differences undoubtedly exist (indeed they are necessary for group cohesion– as Sedgwick [2000] states to identify as, 
one must identify with), it is the exploitation of difference not its existence that Scott draws attention to.  This does not mean that 
equality for oppressed groups is not understandable within an account that calls for “deliberate indifference”; it means only that 
we must qualify which differences we are being indifferent to. 
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(provide the constitutive outside to) various categories that we employ to describe our social reality (i.e. 
subject, agent, person, citizen).  Revealing this construction highlights the masculine bias inherent in 
much of what our language allows us to say19.   
 In another attempt to account for the workings of power inherent in how discourse shapes our 
social world, a materialist perspective proposes that an emphasis on difference or sameness ignores the 
unfolding of history as an inherent conflict of interests and the fact that shifts in ideology reflect less 
scientific “discoveries” in anatomy and physiology than they codify shifts in social relations (Laqueur, 
1985).  Indeed, they are “expressed in terms of the body‟s concrete realities, [however, these shifts in 
ideology are] more deeply grounded in assumptions about the nature of politics and society” (Laqueur, 
1985:16).  Wittig (1992) agrees and offers the following caution regarding interpretations of difference, 
“The concept of difference has nothing ontological about it.  It is only the way that the masters interpret a 
historical situation of domination.  The function of difference is to mask at every level the conflicts of 
interest, including ideological ones” (1992:29).  Following Wittig, we may claim that the forcible 
institution of difference is an aggressive act, attributable to the interests of power working to maintain 
itself. 
Although Wittig has influenced many poststructuralist theorists including Judith Butler, her work 
is much closer to what one might call a post-radical feminist analysis.  Indeed, second wave radical 
feminist Catherine MacKinnon (1987) elaborated a similar position when she distinguished between what 
she terms the difference and the dominance approaches to understanding gender subordination.  The 
former which pervades existing law and current justifications for gender inequality has the following 
underlying assumptions: “[O]n the first day, difference was; on the second day, a division was created 
upon it; on the third day, irrational instances of domination arose.  Division may be rational or irrational.  
Dominance either seems or is justified.  Difference is” (34, emphasis in original).  This particular 
alignment of terms clearly rests on the primacy of gender difference with subsequent and conditional 
divisions which themselves lead to subsequent and conditional instances of dominance.  In this way, 
domination and subordination arises from a fundamental, essential, and unavoidable gender difference in 
a way that difference is privileged, primary, and productive of unequal social conditions.  MacKinnon 
contrasts this notion with an alternate understanding of gender subordination which she terms the 
“dominance approach”:  
                                                          
19 Our language is not color-blind either, as Toni Morrison writes, “Neither blackness nor „people of color‟ stimulates in me 
notions of excessive, limitless love, anarchy, or routine dread.  I cannot rely on these metaphorical shortcuts because I am a black 
writer struggling with and through a language that can powerfully evoke and enforce hidden signs of racial superiority . . . . The 
kind of work I always wanted to do requires me to learn how to maneuver ways to free up language from its sometimes sinister, 
frequently lazy, almost always predictable employment of racially informed and determined chains” (Morrison quoted in 
Hurtado, 2004 [1996]:123-124). 
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[O]n the first day that matters, dominance was achieved, probably by force.  By the second day, 
 division along the same lines had to be relatively firmly in place.  On the third day, if not sooner, 
 differences were demarcated, together with social systems to exaggerate them in perception and 
 in fact, because the systematically differential delivery of benefits and deprivations required 
 making no mistake about who was who (p. 40, emphasis in original). 
 
This alternate alignment of terms cleverly demonstrates the primacy of domination in subsequent and 
conditional understandings of the division of gender and its resultant markings of difference.  In this latter 
interpretation, the forcible establishment of power is both a precursor to and productive of gender division 
as well as the necessary markings of gender difference in order to maintain dominance.  In other words, 
domination came first and difference followed as its justification.  Conversations about gender that begin 
with differences between men and women and subsequently try to explain unequal social conditions have 
it exactly backwards; this includes discussions about gender that begin with anatomy as well as those that 
claim all differences are inconsequential.  In light of MacKinnon‟s analysis gender differences are very 
consequential; they are the consequence of domination.  It is the assertion of power that requires 
differentiation between the dominant and the subordinate; making gender differences and the meaning we 
infuse them with a description and function of social inequality.  
 However, it was poststructuralism20 that has had a seismic impact on feminist analyses over the 
last three decades. Indeed, one might say that poststructuralism has ushered in a new paradigm of feminist 
thought.  Some important questions raised by this new paradigm that will be addressed in this thesis are: 
whether bodies are constituted by, or exist outside of, social discourse; whether women can speak in any 
language that does not exclude or oppress them; and whether women can be subjects or agents in the 
social world. 
 
Linguistics -The Power of the Word
21
 
 In the beginning of the 20th century, Ferdinand de Saussere developed a theory that is often called 
a structuralist account of linguistics (Lemert, 2004).   This theory posits that language is a system that 
                                                          
20
 Wittig and MacKinnon would not claim poststructuralism as their theoretical orientation as their work is much more consistent 
with radical or post-radical feminism. Importantly, there is much about post-radical feminism that is the antithesis of 
poststructuralism including post-radical feminism‟s privileging of dominantion as compared to poststructuralism‟s privileging of 
difference. The nuances of this theoretical divergence will be explored more fully in the conclusion of this thesis.  It is true, 
however, that Wittig and MacKinnon both share one of poststructuralism‟s fundamental assertions which is that the construction 
of difference is an effect of power; it is for this reason that I include them here.   
21
 Irigaray on the power of language and discursive coherence, “I am a woman.  I am being sexualized as feminine.  I am 
sexualized female.  The motivation of my work lies in the impossibility of articulating such a statement; in the fact that its 
utterance is in some way senseless, inappropriate, indecent.  Either because woman is never the attribute of the verb to be nor 
sexualized female a quality of being, or because am a woman is not predicated of I, or because I am sexualized excludes the 
feminine gender.  In other words, the articulation of the reality of my sex is impossible in discourse, and for a structural, eidetic 
reason.  My sex is removed, at least the property of a subject, from the predicative mechanism that assures discursive coherence” 
(Irigaray, 1985: 148-149 emphasis in original). 
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describes difference, so that meaning is conferred simply through conceptual contrast (implicit or 
explicit).  Technically, all definitions contain within them essential contrasts necessary to define the 
concept itself. Therefore, “any unitary concept in fact contains repressed or negated material; it is 
established in explicit opposition to another term” (Scott, 1998:37).  Thus, there are no positive terms in 
language (Salih, 2002:31).  According to Joan Scott, a structured concept in fact works to falsely 
represent a dimension of description upon which it relies for its own definition as an independent, 
autonomous opposite.  Meanings are derived from discursively-established oppositional notions rather 
than some inherently exact opposite.  That is, concepts do not actually mean anything, language is 
provisional, and terms appear fixed but actually circulate (Scott, 1998).  Concepts come to have meaning 
only by their relations with other similar concepts, and the values we assign each.  As Saussure affirms: 
“it is understood that the concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive content but 
negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system.  Their most precise characteristic is in 
being what the others are not” (Saussere in Lemert, 2004:156).  Dorothy Smith summarizes this 
understanding of language, “. . . [A] category is determined by the opposing and determining complement 
from which it is differentiated and carries with it traces of what it is not.  Any category, any term, draws 
into the text or talk as a tacit subtext the other that defines it in difference.  There is no discrete category 
that does not contain the other that defines it in difference” (1996:177). 
 For example, there is no inherent connection between a sign (the spoken or written word “baby”) 
and its referent (the actual little person that you hold in your arms).  All signs derive meaning from their 
relationship to other signs, or their position within the entire structure of language, “Language, in other 
words, is a system of difference” (Salih, 2002:31 emphasis in original).  Important to this analysis, 
language is a structural system that is independent of the human agents who employ them.  In and of 
itself, language is a justifiable category of analysis.  Human subjects are displaced from interest and the 
relationship between signs in the system of language is upheld.  The idea that language does not capture 
reality, that it does not inherently mean anything, and that it can only signify itself amounted to a 
philosophical revolution in thinking about language (Phoca and Wright, 1999:34).  
 Saussere‟s theory is extended (and modified) by Jacques Derrida (1997 [1974]) who sees not only 
a system of difference but a violent subordination among the terms within a binary opposition.  According 
to Derrida, the privileged term is so intimately linked to the term it subordinates, that the subordinate term 
actually generates meaning for the privileged term (Scott, 1994)22.  The violence present in the 
                                                          
22 Esther Newton (1979) provides an interesting visual example of this in her book Mother Camp.  She describes female 
impersonators as gay men who perform “the homosexual situation” (negotiating a respectable social self with the knowledge that 
one‟s “inner” or “real” self is stigmatized) by playing with the masculine-feminine opposition in their acts.  She describes mixing 
sex-role referents (as in wearing jewelry, makeup and heels with a suit and tie) as follows, “The feminine item stands out so 
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subordination of dualities (or binaries) does not innocently describe two things in relation to each other as 
in objectively comparing and contrasting two phenomena.  Rather, a binary describes one thing, it does so 
by expelling and subordinating (negating and denying) that which it is not and in so doing establishes its 
borders and privileges itself.  As captured by Elizabeth Grosz:   
 The problem of dichotomous thought is not the dominance of the pair (some sort of   
 inherent problem with the number two); rather it is the one which makes it problematic,   
 the fact that the one can allow itself no independent, autonomous other. . . The one allows  
 no twos, threes, fours.  It cannot tolerate any other.  The one, in order to be a one, must   
 draw a barrier or boundary around itself, in which case it is necessarily implicated in the   
 establishment of a binary – inside/outside, presence/absence (Grosz, 1994:211 emphases   
 in original). 
 
Misogynistic discourse has produced an account of women‟s bodies which excludes them from a 
view of the world that is dispassionate, rational, and objective.  As has been widely observed, women‟s 
bodies are believed to be incapable of men‟s achievements because women are inextricably linked to their 
bodies in a way that has allowed men to be divested from their own (Grosz, 1994).  Men exclude their ties 
to embodiment/nature/mess by projecting these qualities onto women‟s bodies.  They exclude women 
from knowledge production and place themselves in the entirely false position of mind/reason/order (no 
nature/mess).  As Grosz (1994) concludes, this is the result of collapsing femininity with embodiment.  
  One major effect of this conflation is the violence directed toward women‟s bodies.  As authority 
and subjectivity are removed from a woman‟s body, the logical consequences of this devaluation, 
subordination, and in essence, dehumanization is a move toward violence as fragility and violation are 
intrinsic to the social recognition of a conventionally gendered woman‟s body.  This is in effect the 
removal of women from the position of the subject (producer of knowledge).  As women are defined by 
their bodies, their ability to attain the Enlightenment ideal of dispassionate, rational objectivity is a 
definitional impossibility.  As objects of male desire, protection, and violence (alternately or 
concurrently), women cannot be said to have subjectivity.  Instead, they represent the category of the 
objectified.  As we have seen, a poststructuralist analysis points out that this category is constitutively 
necessary in order to constitute the subjectified.  In other words, that which is not the subject (the object) 
is necessary in order to establish the subject itself (Butler, 1992; Derrida, 1997 [1974]).   
Not only are these binary terms necessary to understand each other (in that they actually 
constitute each other), but the negated term (here, the object) must undergo a violent expulsion from the 
primary term (here, the subject).  There is purposeful violence then, in the construction of the object.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
glaringly by incongruity that it „undermines‟ the masculine system and proclaims that the inner identification is feminine” 
(p.123).  She concludes, “Even one feminine item ruins the integrity of the masculine system; the male loses his caste honor.  The 
superordinate role in a hierarchy is more fragile than the subordinate.  Manhood must be achieved, and once achieved, guarded 
and protected” (p.129).   
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the Enlightenment ideal of rational objectivity which informs our own codes of legitimate claims to 
knowledge, the object is differentiated from the subject in the same way that the body is differentiated 
from the mind (Grosz, 1994).  The subordinate term, (body, object) is expelled to lend definitional 
coherence to the primary term (mind, subject).  The object not only occupies the same devalued position 
as the body (which is conflated with femininity), it also represents chaos, disorder, and irrationality.  The 
body/object is violently imposed upon to create the rational, disembodied mind/subject.  In this way, the 
object is removed from knowledge.  Indeed, the idea of a rational mind capable of objectivity was 
founded on the exclusion of the body, which is taken to represent (and house) specificity, situatedness, the 
mess of our unreasonable emotions.  The body then, is the result of the expulsion of chaos and disorder 
necessary for erecting the cohesion and stability of the mind/consciousness (Kristeva, 1982; Douglas, 
(2002 [1966]).  Discourse, then, rests on androcentric and disembodied concepts to define our notion of 
the “subject”23.  
 Given this, I wish to explore the possibility of an embodied female subjectivity that in our 
current cultural moment appears as both a discursive and physical impossibility.  I mean to demonstrate 
the possibility of a body that has not been radically and violently cast outside of the 
mind/consciousness/self - the possibility of a recognizable woman that has not been radically and 
violently cast outside of the subject.  I believe an account of a woman‟s gendered physical practices (that 
which engenders her culturally intelligible as female) which are incorporated into her production of 
knowledge could lead us to a fully situated female subject.  I specifically do not mean a gender neutral or 
androgynous subject, but an alternate form of recognizing (and treating) women as there is no possibility 
for a gender neutral body in the poststructuralist position as I have defined it here.  With this, I mean to 
clarify that I am not proposing an androgynous subject as that would nullify my project of positing a 
specifically female subjectivity.  Within a poststructuralist analysis, a body is either 
empowered/subjectified/agentic or it is the absence of these things.  In the next paragraph, I will define 
subjectivity through a poststructuralism framework.  
The poststructuralist construction of the subject rests on several assumptions.  First, that 
subjectivity is what confers authority to the subject (it is the agentic force; it is what authorizes the 
subject).  Second, that subjectivity is always already masculine; it carries a history and a debt to 
masculinist ideology.  Third, that subjectivity is the individual‟s embodied claim to power.  Fourth, that 
social forces work to maintain established forms of gendered oppression which privilege men and are 
predicated on removing from women the power implied in subjectivity.  By contrast, I seek to assert the 
                                                          
23 Discourse is androcentric and disembodied and it is other things as well.  For a discussion of how discourse is raced see Aída 
Hurtado‟s (2004 [1996]) The Color of Privilege.  
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possibility of a specifically agentic woman that is culturally readable.  The purpose of this paper is then, 
to explore the possibility of strength and power coming from a woman‟s body in current social contexts 
that discursively conflate femininity with weakness.  I mean to apply a masculinist term like subjectivity 
to a woman‟s body without reductive violence.  To arrive at this end, I must first explore in more depth 
the poststructuralist argument that allows for the reorganization of concepts and thus, a new way of 
thinking. 
 
Poststructuralist Possibility of Reclamation in Language 
Derrida calls for the analytic deconstruction of the operation of différance in the binary 
construction of meaning.  This specifically Derridian process of deconstruction24 consists of first 
reversing the two concepts and then displacing the meanings attached to each.  This process serves to 
expose the interdependence of seemingly discrete and oppositional terms while locating each in a 
particular discursive context.  Again, as outlined by Elizabeth Grosz:   
 Taken together, reversal and its useful displacement show the necessary but unfounded   
 function of these terms in Western thought.  One must both reverse the dichotomy and   
 the value attached to the two terms, as well as displace the excluded term, placing it   
 beyond its oppositional role, as the internal condition of the dominant term.  This move   
 makes clear the violence of the hierarchy and the debt the dominant term owes to the   
 subordinate one.  It also demonstrates that there are other ways of conceiving these terms  
 than dichotomously.  If these terms were only or necessarily dichotomies, the process of   
 displacement would not be possible.  Although historically necessary, the terms are not   
 logically necessary (Grosz quoted in Scott, 1988:49, emphasis added). 
 
This process of deconstruction applied to the possibility of a female subject would go as follows.  
As Butler (1992) has laid out, currently the fixed referent of the category of women is weakness, and what 
signifies this is femininity.  Displaced at the level of the referent then, the fixed referent of the category of 
women would become strength and what signified this would be femininity.  Significantly, this 
displacement inherently requires the fixed referent of the category of men to become weakness and what 
signifies this would be masculinity.  This makes clear the reliance of masculinity and strength on the 
denigrated (expelled) categories of femininity and weakness.  This simple linguistic and symbolic 
exercise clearly establishes the possibility of a different alignment of terms (women are not inherently 
tied to weakness).  Alternately, displacement could be extended to the level of the signifier as follows.  
The fixed referent of the category of women is weakness and what signifies this would be masculinity.  
This would then require that the fixed referent of the category of men would be strength and what 
                                                          
24 As opposed to a more general dismantling of a text.  Also, this process begins to try to locate meaning within a larger 
discursive context, while still remaining largely indifferent to historical periods, political climates, and relations of power.  
Importantly, many followers of poststructuralist thought have extended the importance of contextualization by relating discourse 
back to the material conditions of history and political and economic power. 
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signifies this would be femininity.  This also establishes the possibility of a different alignment of terms 
(women are not inherently tied to femininity). 
In the symbolic realm (discourse), the fixed referent of the category of women is weakness, 
passivity, violability and femininity is what signifies this category. Therefore the subordination of women 
becomes justified as the referent for women (weakness) is normalized and conflated with the signifier for 
women (femininity).  While in a discursive realm, we may consider that signifiers do not bear a 
relationship to anything real, they have a relationship only to other signifiers and are understandable only 
through other signs within the same system.  Even within this abstracted realm, the fusion of women‟s 
referent and signifier is consequential in that women can only be recognized (referred to) by 
representations of weakness (signified by femininity).  The way we come into an intelligible space is 
through “appropriate” (required, enforced) feminine body comportment, which signifies weakness.  
Women are recognizable as women by signifying violability.  That this has consequences for the violence 
done to women‟s bodies is not difficult to imagine.  
Drawing on Saussure, this deconstruction is meant to reveal two things – that all terms are 
defined not by what they are, but in how they relate to other (indefinable/unreal) terms and that because 
there is no foundation upon which any term can be said to rest, other definitions (and subsequent ways of 
organizing meaning) are possible.  What this process of deconstruction seeks to establish by exposing the 
artifice of binary constructs is the “social liberation of the concept from its natural “referent” (Poovey, 
1988: 59 emphasis added).  In demonstrating the artificiality of binary constructs, the identity of each 
term as well as the discourse that fashions it as natural and prevents any other possibility from 
articulation, is subject to destabilization.  It opens up to scrutiny the logic necessary to circulate and 
justify hierarchical thinking (Poovey, 1988).  Différance25 then can be understood as a tapestry of 
signification and meaning (discourse) that bears no relationship to the “real” that it is naively assumed to 
reflect.  Lois Shawver (1996) offers the following excellent example as an explanation of “différance”:    
 Imagine observing a quilt on the wall with patches of yellow, blue and     
 white.  If you notice the yellow and the non-yellow, you see a pattern of concentric   
 boxes.  If you notice the blue and the non-blue you see a checkered design.  Each pattern   
 is a play of differences, but it is a different set of differences when yellow is    
 differentiated from non-yellow than when blue is differentiated from non-blue, a    
 different set of differences that shows us different patterns. What is interesting about this   
 shift from one pattern to the other is that it not only calls our attention to a new pattern,   
 but that it suppresses our awareness of the other pattern. . . You cannot study the pattern   
                                                          
25 Derrida uses this term to describe the interplay between presence and absence, interiority and exteriority.  In French the verb 
“différer” means both “to differ” and “to defer”.  Derrida‟s meaning here is twofold; différance is the condition of being different, 
it is also the condition of being deferred (A. Scott, 2002).  The play on words here is not detectable when speaking this word in 
French, only in writing it. This subtle linguistic disruption is literally “unspeakable” (Phoca and Wright, 1999: 48).  His idea of 
“unspeakable différance” has been appropriated by feminists as it applies to the condition of women in a phallocentric 
misogynisitic discourse. 
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 of yellows and the pattern of blues at the same time because différance causes one or the   
 other patterns to be „deferred‟.  Différance is the hidden way of seeing things that is   
 deferred out of awareness by our distraction with the imagery that captures our attention. 
  
According to Derrida, the relationship between the dominant and subordinate term can be 
uncovered only by questioning the system in which the artificial construction was made necessary 
(Derrida, 1982).  What any signifier (concept) actually means then, is necessarily undefined and 
relational, grounded not by truth (as Saussure established – ideas do not predate the words we develop to 
name them [Lemert, 2004]) but is dependent upon the value assigned to countless other signifiers with 
which we try to understand it (Derrida, 1982).  “Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a 
chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play 
of differences.  Such a play, différance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of 
conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general” (Derrida, 1982: 11).  I wish to draw on his 
analysis to assert that female subjectivity is likewise a possibility of conceptuality. 
 
The Discursive is Located in the Material  
Poststructuralist deconstruction of binaries offers insight into the workings of power behind our 
notions of male/female, masculine/feminine, and subject/object (among others).  It suggests an 
investigation into the interests (the organization of power relations) behind the conceptualities that are 
allowed and those that are not.  On this point, Chrys Ingraham (1994) quotes Louis Althusser, “A word or 
concept cannot be considered in isolation; it only exists in the theoretical or ideological framework in 
which it is used: its problematic”.  Ingraham goes on to explain that a text‟s problematic is the tension 
operating beneath the surface, “It appears as the answer to questions left unasked.  It is not that which is 
left unsaid or unaccounted for, but that which the text assumes and does not speak” (1994:207).  Relating 
ideological frameworks back to the structural forces that shape people‟s lives, Ingraham concludes: 
“[I]deology is central to the reproduction of the social order.  Because it produces what is allowed to 
count as reality, ideology constitutes a material force” (1994:207).  By defining ideology as a material 
force, Ingraham offers a possibility of integrating a certain concreteness into the abstracted 
conceptualizations of discourse/ideology. 
Extending this point, we may say that women are discursively established as “other”, and what 
represents this “otherness” is the woman, identifiable by her body.  A woman‟s body is the site upon 
which “otherness” is established, erected, and justified.  That is, what renders a woman socially readable 
(femininity) is the site upon which violence is constructed.  This requires us to fully consider the domain 
of recognition, established by discourse, as it acts on a woman‟s body.  The domain of recognition, which 
is the physical articulation of difference, is on the body and in its forms and effects.   
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The reverse is also true, that material relations and economic and political interests are in 
discourse and ideology.  That is, bodies are shaped by economic, political, and historical forces that 
acquire meaning (are codified in) particular discursive contexts.  Toril Moi on the importance of this 
point:     
Women under patriarchy are oppressed because they are women, not because they are 
irredeemably Other.  Anti-semitism is directed against Jews, and South-African racism against 
blacks, not simply against abstract Otherness. . . The fact that oppressors tend to equate the 
oppressed group with ontological Otherness, perceived as a threatening, disruptive, alien force, is 
precisely an ideological maneouvre designed to mask the concrete material grounds for 
oppression and exploitation.  Only a materialist analysis can provide a credible explanation of 
why the burden of Otherness has been placed on this or that particular group in a given society at 
a given time (1988:12 emphases added).   
 
The study of ideology, if not grounded in material relations, is ignorant of its history.  Ideologies without 
history are ideologies without a cause or an explanation and anything without a cause cannot lend itself to 
systematic analysis.  Poststructuralist analysis and the study of semantics were both correct to view 
discourse and language as inherently justifiable categories of analysis.  The error, I believe, was in 
treating each as a closed system, removed from context, conflict, and history.   To capture the 
interrelatedness of the government, the economy, the political climate and ideology, Ingraham offers the 
following: “Materialism here means a mode of inquiry that examines the division of labor and the 
distribution of wealth in the context of historically prevailing national and state interests and ideological 
struggles over meaning and value” (1994:205).  The interrelatedness between the material and the 
discursive is complex and deep and each cannot be fully accounted for without reference to the other. 
 
Poststructuralism on the Violence Necessary to Create Sex 
In a poststructuralist analysis, subjects are not merely affected by or acted on by discourse (as in 
Foucault‟s early work on “docile bodies” (1995 [1977]), they are constitutively produced by discourse as 
Judith Butler summarizes: “It is simply not a strong enough claim to say that the „I‟ is situated; the „I‟ is 
constituted by these positions, and these „positions‟ are not merely theoretical products, but fully 
embedded organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements, those matrices of 
power and discourse that produce me as a viable „subject‟” (Butler, 1992:9).   
On this point, Butler draws from Derrida who in turn credits Saussere with locating the speaking 
subject after language, and for noting that if language is not a product of the speaking subject, than the 
subject must be the product of language.  Derrida notes how this is to say that the subject only becomes a 
speaking subject by conforming to the system of language, the play of differences (1982).  Judith Butler 
materializes this production of the subject (brings it the level of the body, demonstrates its relationship to 
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the real [referent]) by highlighting the utter unintelligibility of bodies that do not cohere to the rigid 
prescriptions of the sex binary.  The mark of gender according to Butler, qualifies a body as human, that 
is, readable.  “Consider the medical interpellation which (the recent emergence of the sonogram 
notwithstanding) shifts an infant from an „it‟ to a „she‟ or a „he‟, and in that naming, the girl is „girled‟, 
brought into the domain of language and kinship through the interpellation of gender” (Butler, 1993:7).  
With this example it becomes quite clear that we do not have linguistic or discursive space for beings that 
are not appropriately gendered.  Before girl infants are “girled” and boy infants are “boyed” (when “she” 
or “he” was an “it”), we cannot account for these infants in human terms.  
 “[G[endering is, among other things, the differentiating relations by which speaking subjects 
come into being” (Butler, 1993:7).  Drawing on Wittig and Foucault, Butler asserts “sex does not describe 
a prior materiality, but produces and regulates the intelligibility of the materiality of bodies” (1992:17 
emphases in original).  “This does not mean that there is no such thing as the material body, but that we 
can only apprehend that materiality through discourse” (Salih, 2002:74).  Butler argues here that the 
categorization of sex “can be called a violent one, a forceful one, and that this discursive ordering and 
production of bodies in accord with the category of sex is itself a material violence” (Butler, 1992:17 
emphasis added).  Because Butler asserts that the body cannot exist before or outside of gendered 
discourse, the discursive violence that produces a female subject26 is actually constitutive violence. 
 Through Butler‟s poststructuralist framework, we can clearly see that there is no possibility of 
imagining a human (that is, a subject) that can be said to exist prior to an intelligible reading of gender, as 
it is gender that constructs the human (subject) as human.  Our discursive relationship to gender then, is 
not descriptive (sorting bodies into one category or another - male or female), but instead operates 
through exclusion (to assign humanness to a body I must implicitly acknowledge what lies outside this 
category- that there are persons that lie outside humanness). Those bodies that do not fit into this 
constructed binary, that are not immediately recognizable as male or female fall into the space of the 
dehumanized, abjected other against which the category of human is itself established (Butler, 2008 
[1990]; Butler, 1993; Kristeva, 1982).  Through a similar process, there is purposeful violence done 
through the act of constructing a subject.  Those excluded from subjectivity must also be constructed to 
counterpose the subject and give this term meaning.  The process occurs “through the creation of a 
domain of deauthorized subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection, populations erased from view” (Butler, 
1992:13). By extension, discussion of “identity” cannot exist prior to or outside of discussions of “gender 
identity” because “„persons‟ only become intelligible through becoming gendered in conformity with 
                                                          
26 By “subject” here I am referring to Butler‟s understanding of the discursive production that establishes the appearance of a 
social actor.  This is different from my definition of a “subject” in the sense of an agentic person. 
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recognizable standards of gender intelligibility” (Butler, 2008 [1990]:22).  Subjects then, are the effect of 
discourse, there is no pre-linguistic, pre-discursive self, subject or body.  The gendered body (necessarily 
gendered before it may be socially intelligible) comes into existence only through the naming (language 
and discourse) and practices (physical acts) that constitute it (Salih, 2002:65).   
 
Discourse Acts on our Bodies – the Importance of Naming 
  With her focus on naming and practices, Butler has developed an account of the performative 
articulations of gender.  This notion draws from J.L. Austin‟s How to Do Things with Words (1975) 
wherein he establishes a linguistic category of “performatives” which function as actions rather than 
statements (Nussbaum, 2000).  This type of utterance does not merely describe or recount an occurrence; 
it in fact does what is being said. It is an active performance as distinguished from a passive statement.  
For example, (in appropriate settings) when one says “I bet ten dollars”, or “I name this ship . . .”, or “I 
do”, one is engaging in a type of utterance that does not report on these events but performs them 
(Nussbaum, 2000).  Importantly, what is considered a performative utterance is determined by social 
convention and existing rituals, which is undeniably discursive. 
Butler adds to this Althusser‟s concept of “interpellation” – subject positions are extended and 
accepted through the action of “hailing” (Salih, 2002:78).  “[H]e uses the term interpellation to describe 
the „hailing‟ of a person into her or his social and ideological position by an authority figure.  Althusser 
gives the example of a policeman calling out „Hey, you there!‟ to a man [sic] on the street.  By calling 
out, the police interpellates the man as a subject and by turning around, the man takes up his position as 
such” (Salih, 2002: 78).   This example nicely demonstrates that with the act of physically turning around 
the man positions his body into the realm of social discourse; that is, how a physical act positions one 
discursively27.  Alternately, glancing at an infant‟s or fetus‟ genitals (physical body), the proclamation 
“It‟s a girl” effectively establishes her as a subject within social discourse.  This type of speech act is 
performative (in the sense that Butler [from J.L.Austin] uses this term) in that through language, a girl is 
not being described, a girl is being constituted (Salih, 2002:80).  Through language, bodies are never 
merely described or reported on; they are constituted in the descriptive process.  “When we act and speak 
in a gendered way, we are not simply reporting on something that is already fixed in the world, we are 
actively constituting it, replicating it, and reinforcing it.  By behaving as if there were male and female 
                                                          
27 The reverse is also true that by doing something entirely discursive like writing, our bodies must be made visible (in a 
discursive act, we must position ourselves physically).  This argument is made by Monique Wittig (1992) although instead of 
using the term „interpellation‟ (which it could be understood as – constructing a subject in the act of writing) she describes her 
theory as a “materialist approach to language”.  She notes that personal pronouns are the mark of gender in language, they 
“designate the locutors in discourse . . . they are also the pathways and the means of entrance into language”.  She concludes, 
“[personal pronouns] forc[e] every locutor, if she belongs to the oppressed sex, to proclaim it in her speech, that is, to appear in 
language under her proper physical form” (1992:78-79).  
20 
 
„natures‟, we co-create the social fiction that these natures exist” (Nussbaum, 2000).  Butler‟s notion of 
performative utterances that discursively produce subjects is how she places her discursive theory back 
into the realm of the “social”, the world of embodied people, activity and interaction, that 
poststructuralism does not adequately incorporate (Smith, 1996).   
 
The Discursive inside the Material 
Within the confines of poststructuralist theory, any rejection of a subjugated status, any attempt to 
disrupt what discourse has claimed for you can frustratingly only occur within this (oppressive) category.  
Outside of gender, women are not understood as subjects and therefore cannot speak at all, let alone about 
their gendered oppression.  Butler comments on this point: “This is a „girl‟, however, who is compelled to 
„cite‟ the norm in order to qualify and remain a viable subject.  Femininity is thus not the product of a 
choice, but the forcible citation of a norm, one whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations 
of discipline, regulation, and punishment” (Butler, 1993:232).  Women must speak from this category 
(and write “she” and “her”) if we do not, we have no claim to speech.  “The „I‟ who would oppose its 
construction is always in some sense drawing from that construction to articulate its oppositions; further, 
the „I‟ draws what is called its „agency‟ in part through being implicated in the very relations of power it 
seeks to oppose” (Butler, 1993:122-123).  The constitution of the subject is at once empowering and 
disabling, “„constitution‟ carries both the enabling and violating sense of „subjection‟” (Butler, 1993:122-
123).  Echoing Wittig, Butler sees women entering social discourse “through being called or hailed in 
injurious terms” (1993:122-123).   
 With the performance of discursively produced subjects, Butler offers a new way to incorporate 
the engagement between the discursive/ideological and the concrete realm of social interaction.  As an 
extension, Butler‟s answer to the complex relationship between materiality itself and discourse is a fully 
integrated account of the discursive inside the material.  She is clear that we should not be content to 
consider these notions as necessary opposites.  To do so would be to invisibilize the workings of power 
that orchestrates the construction of the body itself (1993:29).  “What does it mean to have recourse to 
materiality, since it is clear from the start that matter has a history (indeed, more than one) and that the 
history of matter is in part determined by the negotiation of sexual difference” (Butler, 1993:29).   We 
cannot ground our claims for social justice on the materiality of the female body and proclaim that this is 
the site upon which violations occur and hence what we must mobilize around because “matter itself is 
founded through a set of violations” (Butler, 1993:29 emphasis in original).  In other words, we cannot 
claim anything like equality, justice, or subjectivity by grounding our claims in the “realness” of our 
bodies as this surface is always already the site of violence and discursive production.  “And against those 
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who would claim that the body‟s irreducible materiality is a necessary precondition for feminist practice, I 
suggest that that prized materiality may well be constituted through an exclusion and degradation of the 
feminine that is profoundly problematic for feminism” (Butler, 1993:30 emphasis added).  Materiality for 
Butler is not reducible to discourse or the stuff of language or a set of signifiers.  Indeed to hold this 
position would be to fail to understand that signification is embedded within materiality from the start.  
While she presents a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between the realm of ideas 
and the realm of materiality than was present in earlier modernist attempts that distinguished idealism 
from materialism, her analysis is not without its own limitations.  
The Limits of Discourse – An Historical Critique 
Interpellation and performativity are compelling concepts because they focus our attention on 
how language constitutes us as subjects and so these ideas highlight the constraints we face in claiming 
for ourselves a subject position uninhibited by the masculinist bias contained in our language.  However, 
it has been argued that these concepts do not adequately explain historical change or social reform.  For 
example, as noted by Aída Hurtado writing about the performance of masculinity, “Enactment, although 
interesting to study in an evolutionary kind of way is irrelevant to power.  It alone does not bring power; 
power has to already have been allocated to this particular group of people, men, before the enactment of 
manhood can have any meaning” (2004[1996]:127 emphasis added). 
This suggests that because power organizes itself first and subsequently seeks out means for its 
justification (recall MacKinnon‟s account of dominance arising first and difference following), the 
organization of power relations behind the organization of ideology is necessary to consider.  For 
example, one might ask how a poststructuralist analysis of the male/female binary and the “othering” of 
women would be able to address the diverse levels of gender inequality in different historical social 
formations.  Anthropological accounts of some hunting and gathering societies locate significantly more 
fluid and egalitarian relations among men and women than occurred in later agrarian societies where rigid 
patriarchal gender relations organized social life (Leap, 1994).  Also, in some hunting and gathering 
societies, hermaphrodites held prestigious positions even though they could not be easily read or 
categorized as male or female (Reed, 1975).  Here it appears that cultural discourses allowed for different 
bodies since hermaphrodites were not treated as culturally unreadable or abject, but rather as having more 
prestige and insights than more distinct males or females (Reed, 1975).  Yet, the discursively constructed 
categories of male/female existed in each of these social formations; therefore, we must assume that these 
categories were constructed around different material relations (of food procurement/production and 
social organization) and that these factors led to different understandings of gendered relations.  That is, if 
the “othering” of women and the abjection of hermaphrodites only occur under certain historically 
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specific conditions, this would suggest that discourse is a product of transformations in the material world 
rather than that discourse shapes, molds, or constitutes materiality.  Christine Delphy summarizes this 
point: “A feminist interpretation of history is therefore „materialist‟ in the broad sense; that is, its 
premises lead it consider intellectual production as the result of social relationships, and the later as 
relationships of domination”(2005 [1998]:293 emphasis added).  
 
The Separation of the Discursive with the Material 
 There is a difference between feminist work that seeks to undermine current social conditions of 
inequality for women by changing the social structures (material relations) of family, economy, polity, 
and other gendered institutions, and scholarship that seeks to undermine current social conditions of 
inequality by establishing a place for women in discourse (language, representations, symbols).  I hope to 
establish with this paper that women‟s gendered physical practices traverse these two levels of analysis 
and cannot be said to inhabit one or the other more fully, that is, we cannot hierarchicalize them.  I hope 
to incorporate a materialist- deconstructive feminist analysis that is capable of accounting for these two 
distinct levels of analysis as they are played out on a woman‟s body because a woman‟s body is the 
discursive production interacting with the material reality that establishes the meaning by which she 
relates to the world.  As it relates to social practices, the concept of embodiment is a central feminist 
concern because it is this fluid, dynamic, and contested border.   
 Demonstrating a materialist analysis at the institutional level, Nancy Fraser (1998) theoretically 
separates what she terms “injustices of distribution” (material resources) from “injustices of recognition” 
(p.141).  The latter is not merely a psychological injury as she explains by bringing this type of injustice 
into the social or material realm: 
To be misrecognized, in my view, is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down on, or devalued 
in others‟ conscious attitudes or mental beliefs.  It is rather to be denied the status of a full partner 
in social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer in social life . . . as a consequence 
of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evaluation that constitute one as comparatively 
unworthy of respect or esteem (Fraser, 1998:141 emphases in original).   
 
With this, Fraser reformulates a status injury as a socially orchestrated attempt to remove personhood 
from certain groups of people.  These injuries are 
  . . . rooted in social patterns of interpretation, evaluation, and communication, hence, if you like, 
 in the symbolic order.  But this does not mean that they are „merely‟ symbolic.  On the contrary, 
 the norms, significations, and constructions of personhood that impede women, racialized 
 peoples, and/or gays and lesbians from parity of participation in social life are materially 
 instantiated – in institutions and social practices, in social action and embodied habitus, and yes, 
 in ideological state apparatuses (Fraser, 1998: 43-44). 
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 Fraser takes issue with Butler‟s (following Foucault‟s) account of discourse producing subjects as 
well as her resulting privileging of subversion as taking place only in discourse (with concepts like 
resignification and performativity).  Fraser calls for historicization to reveal the interests of power behind 
current social relations, in order to highlight the political, economic, and resulting social effects of global 
capitalism.  By broadly defining “material” as that which is more than economic relations of 
maldistribution, but an organized social instrument of injustice, Fraser rejects the denial of subjectivity to 
certain persons as reducible to what resources they have (i.e. economic capital, physical capital, cultural 
capital). 
 On this point, Bourdieu agrees and refines this observation to specific bodily effects: “[he] argues 
that social classes develop clearly identifiable relations to their bodies which result in the production of 
distinct bodily forms.  These bodily forms are valued differently and are central to the formation of social 
inequalities in the quantities and qualities of physical capital produced by individuals” (Shilling, 
1993:130).  The bourgeois class, for example develops a bodily form that is characterized by “a certain 
breadth of gesture, posture and gait, which manifests [itself] by the amount of physical space that is 
occupied . . . and above all by the restrained, measured, self-assured tempo” (Bourdieu, 1984:218 quoted 
in Shilling, 1993:132).  Important to Bourdieu‟s account of the reproduction of inequality is that there are 
“substantial inequalities in the symbolic values accorded to particular bodily forms” (Shilling, 1993:133 
emphasis in original).  In a sense this is quantification of the symbolic value attached to the body itself, 
the meanings we assign to it which establishes Bourdieu‟s concept of “symbolic violence”.  In this way, 
Bourdieu puts forth his own formulation of how the discursive/ideological is embedded within the 
material body, that symbolic value is assigned or removed from bodies which justifies reproduction of the 
system of inequality.  Although this system originates with material relations of maldistribution, it is 
given form and function and justification through a largely discursive incorporation28 of such an 
imbalance of power.  Echoing Bourdieu by noting how the effects of symbolic violence arise from 
material oppression and are condensed and abstracted into discourse and ideology, Wittig writes: 
  The ideology of sexual difference functions as censorship in our culture by masking, on the 
 ground of nature, the social opposition between men and women.  Masculine/feminine, 
 male/female are the categories which serve to conceal the fact that social differences always 
 belong to an economic, political, ideological order.  Every system of domination establishes 
 divisions at the material and economic level.  Furthermore, the divisions are abstracted and turned 
 into concepts by the masters, and later on by the slaves when they rebel and start to struggle.  The 
                                                          
28 By “discursive incorporation” I am referring to Bourdieu‟s (1990) understanding of how the political, economic and material 
system of injustice and inequality gets inside our system of language, concepts, ideology, and discourse.  Material 
maldistribution, oppression, and exploitation become incorporated into discourse, according to Bourdieu, through the symbolic 
values we assign to different bodies.  In effect, this is a symbolic system stemming from material relations that acts on physical 
bodies.  In this way, Bourdieu‟s analysis posits both an abstraction (of material relations into symbolic values) and a 
solidification (of symbolic values onto physical bodies). 
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 masters explain and justify the established divisions as a result of natural differences.  The slaves, 
 when they rebel and start to struggle, read social oppositions into the so-called natural 
 differences (1992: 2).   
 
In this passage, she locates the effects of domination first in the material/economic realm which later 
become abstracted into language and concepts.  That is, systems of domination establish divisions at the 
material level which subsequently become abstracted into ideology; these divisions are then justified by 
referencing “natural” differences.  So called natural differences which justify and even appear to cause 
social inequality are actually its effects.  This ties into Bourdieu‟s argument that social inequalities are 
represented on our bodies, that symbolic or social value (domination or oppression) appears on the body 
itself.   
 Drawing from this understanding that material relations become abstracted into discourse and that 
in turn, discourse gets solidified into physical bodies, by using a materialist-deconstructive approach to 
this thesis, I intend to use a very literal definition of physical violability or vulnerability, as I understand 
these terms to be descriptive of femininity.  As I will support with empirical studies later in this paper, I 
believe the feminine social script literally shapes and deforms a woman‟s body.  Importantly, my 
understanding of the discursive script that productively molds and restricts feminine bodies is that it is in 
the analytic domain of discourse - one that exists in a separate dimension of analysis from the economic 
domain of the structural system.  I rely here on Nancy Fraser‟s (2004) separation of the (economic) 
dimension of redistribution from the (cultural) dimension of recognition29, “The point is to account for the 
existence in capitalist society of at least two major orders of subordination: class hierarchy, which denies 
some actors the resources they need in order to interact with others as peers, and status hierarchy, which 
denies some the requisite social standing” (2004:1115).  I believe she writes first about women as a 
subordinated class and second about women as non-subjects.  While they do interact in complex ways, 
she maintains their distinction as will I in this thesis30.   
                                                          
29 In her later work, she extends her analysis to include a third (political) dimension of representation by which she means 
government and policy. 
30 In attempting to develop an integrated perspective about these two modes of analysis, Nancy Fraser (2004) embraces the 
phrase originally developed by second-wave socialist-feminists, “dual systems approach”.  With this approach, she posits two 
(later, three) separate systems or sets of relations which is quite a controversial maneuver.  Separating out patriarchy (gender 
oppression) from capitalism (class oppression) is not without its critics.  The opposition as captured by Joan Acker (1988): 
“Economic dependence is recognized as fundamental to the powerlessness of women in this society by almost everyone who has 
written about the condition of women” (p.476).  Acker herself proposes a reformulation of the concept of class by arguing that 
the relations that produce class are also gendered processes.  Writing in 1988, perhaps she can be forgiven for not including the 
well recognized integrated concept today that the relations that produce class not only also produce gender but they produce race 
and (hetero)sexuality as well.  Acker skillfully extends the concept of class to include gendered distribution and gendered 
relations of production, but she maintains the primacy of a class analysis.  By contrast, Fraser maintains the primacy of both 
redistribution (class) and recognition (race, gender, sexuality and others) without reducing one into an analysis developed for the 
other.  In her later work, Acker (1992) separates out four analytically distinct processes that “constitut[e] the gendered 
understructure of society‟s institutions”.  First are the “overt decisions and procedures” which include hiring practices, defining 
job descriptions, and legal codes.  Second, are the construction of images and ideologies that justify and reinforce the above 
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The undeniable and important fact that women are economically dependent on men does act on 
what I believe to be the separate dimension of discourse that acknowledges “recognition” or 
“subjectivity”.  That is, economic dependence (maldistribution) and the learned helplessness of femininity 
(non-subjectivity) are integrally related and the injustice of resource distribution does not go away in 
positing women as deserving of equal social standing (positing women as subjects).  In positing women 
as subjects, what is contested is femininity itself, which is in effect the injustice of the denial of 
recognition.  In this assertion of subjectivity which is the refusal of the sexual object position, women 
become subjects (McCaughey, 1998).  My analysis then will focus not on the injustices of resource 
distribution (which is an important but analytically distinct domain) but on the injustices of the 
discursively established feminine social script, which is the embodied denial of recognition31.  This is my 
own formulation of how the discursive/ideological acts on and through the materiality of bodies.  My 
argument then is that women are physically vulnerable because they have learned femininity in becoming 
women.  In other words, women are physically vulnerable when they become culturally recognizable as 
women.   
 
The Object of Violence – A Woman’s Body 
In our current cultural moment, women are recognized in the embodiment of femininity and 
femininity is the demonstration of a non-subject status.  The embodied subjectivity of a woman is an 
inherent contradiction because what we recognize as the successful articulation of femininity is the 
absence of this subjectivity (MacKinnon, 1987).  “That is, the reason that men can travel where women 
ought not to is only that women can be and are raped (whereas men can be, but are not often), not that 
women can be and are mugged or beaten up (as in fact men can be, and are)” (Cahill, 2000:55).  Dangers 
exist not to her body, the bearer of her subjectivity, but to her sexuality (the part of her that represents her 
sex, that which signals her social position).  This threat of violence is as it root, social. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
practices.  Third are interactional processes (“doing gender”) and fourth are internal processes (like constructing gender identity).  
Importantly, she maintains a distinction between practices (the first) and ideology (the second). However, her focus here is on the 
constitution of work, the separation of production from reproduction and the masculine bias in work, production, the formation of 
the state and the workings of capitalist economies.  This leads her to put forth what I would argue is still fundamentally a class 
analysis that reduces a gender analysis to class concepts which Fraser‟s theory does not.  Fraser explicitly maintains the 
distinction between each system and thus does not reduce and grossly distort either in an attempt to understand it within the 
framework developed for the other.  It is for this reason that I side with Fraser, however, my position is distinguishable from 
Fraser‟s in that although capitalism and patriarchy are analytically distinct, I believe they interrelate in constitutive ways.  I 
believe her use of the phrase “dual systems approach” implies more autonomy among each system than I believe exists. 
31 For example, a woman fighting off an attacker, verbally confronting a heckler, or even the simple act of unapologetically 
taking up physical or conversational space, are all demonstrations of the refusal of the cultural impositions of femininity which 
require that women not do these things.  My point in the analytical distinction between the injustices of resource distribution and 
the injustices of recognition are exemplified in these examples, where economic dependence or independence cannot adequately 
speak to these assertions of subjectivity.   
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“The threat of rape, then, is a constitutive and sustained moment in the production of the feminine 
body” (Cahill, 2000:56).  Transwoman activist and author Kate Bornstein positions her lived experience 
as a born male raised with race, gender, and class privilege in agreement with this analysis:  
“Male privilege is assuming one has the right to occupy any space or person by whatever means, 
with or without permission.  It‟s a sense of entitlement that‟s unique to those who have been 
raised male in most cultures – it‟s notably absent in most girls and women.  Male privilege is not 
something given to men in this culture, it‟s something that men take . . . Male privilege is, in a 
word, violence” (Bornstein, 1994:108).   
 
By describing a sense of entitlement as an act of violence, Bornstein demonstrates an important link 
between ideology and physical practices.  McCaughey agrees that power has created what we have come 
to recognize as masculinity, not the other way around; similarly, gendered subjugation has created what 
we have come to recognize as femininity, “The very things that mark us as successful feminine women 
make us easy victims” (McCaughey, 1997:90).   
Wittig calls attention to the material, bodily violence that can result from discourse: “When we 
use the overgeneralizing term „ideology‟ to designate all the discourses to the domain of Irreal Ideas; we 
forget the material (physical) violence that they directly do to the oppressed people, a violence produced 
by the abstract and „scientific‟ discourses as well as by the discourses of the mass media” (Wittig, 
1992:25).  In this respect, discourse is real, it has real effects on the body, it is not confined to the 
abstracted domain of concepts: “It is itself real since it one of the aspects of oppression, since it exerts a 
precise power over us.  The pornographic discourse is one of the strategies of violence which are 
exercised upon us: it humiliates, it degrades, it is a crime against our „humanity‟” (Wittig, 1992:26).  
From this perspective, pornography is symbolic violence because it shows women as objects of male 
sexual fantasies.  It depicts women as sexual objects which is necessarily the removal of subjectivity and 
humanity.  It is insightful to note how much this approach shares with certain modernist radical feminist 
opponents of pornography who also believe that these images have the (performative utterance) power to 
do what they depict.  For example, a certain branch of radical feminist activists led by Andrea Dworkin 
and Catherine MacKinnon pushed for the enactment of anti-porn legislation32 on these very grounds33.  In 
                                                          
32 As a skilled legal scholar, MacKinnon produced a sophisticated account of what constitutes “free speech” and is thus 
protectable under the First Amendment in her book, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (1987).  In this work she 
notes that pornographers wishing to exercise their freedom of speech are inevitably claiming that sexual access to women is 
freedom.  They claim to publish “sex” but do so primarily in the form of women‟s bodies displayed for erotic male visual 
consumption.  Upholders of this “right” fail to recognize that the marketplace of ideas that the First Amendment seeks to protect 
is literally a marketplace, those with the most resources can purchase the protection for what they wish to “say” (1987:140).  
MacKinnon herself has little faith that legal prohibitions on pornography would do anything but further eroticize it.  Specifically, 
she fought for the right of women to sue if they were harmed in the production or distribution or consumption of pornography.    
33 There are other branches of feminism that argue for the protection of pornography on grounds other than the protection of free 
speech.  Gayle Rubin (1993) for example, urges us not to confuse sexually explicit material with sexually exploitative material.  
She argues for a possibility of material that is both sexually explicit and sexually non-exploitative to women (“feminist porn” if 
you like).  Conversely, MacKinnon and Dworkin argue against this possibility, as they see it, in our current misogynistic 
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support of the ongoing project to recognize the interrelatedness of ideological representations and 
material reality Drucilla Cornell offers the following: “Yet for both MacKinnon and Butler, feminist work 
is grounded in an insistence upon the material force of representations, linguistic as well as visual . . . 
[both theorists] focu[s] on the ways in which representations have constitutive force, the way in which 
who we are is deeply connected to how we are represented34” (1999: paragraph 3).  
 As an example of the constitutive force of ideology, Martha McCaughey (1997) presents the 
challenges faced by women who have sought training in self-defense classes.  She describes how verbal 
or psychological assaults suddenly become visible to women who are training in physical forms of self-
defense.  A word, a sneer, even a look can be part of the assault.  In addition to learning physical 
maneuvers that would allow a woman to neutralize or overpower an assailant, “women learn a new set of 
assertive responses to various forms of intimidation, threat, and harassment that fall along the continuum 
of sexual violence”.  One instructor explains, “The physical aspect is such a little part of what self-
defense is.  We women are always defending ourselves all the time, just the little slurs on the street, the 
looks, the stares, interacting with a boss or teacher that‟s not taking you seriously.  That‟s all self-defense.  
That„s the harder part of self-defense” (McCaughey, 1997:117).  What the instructor identifies as more 
difficult is not the physical aspect of self-defense but the assertion of subjectivity in social interaction 
which is evidence to the power of the injustice of discursive non-recognition. 
   On the power of the ideological to act on our bodies, Sharon Marcus explains that rapes occur 
not because men are actually, physically, unavoidably stronger then women but because gendered social 
scripts position men as dominant, aggressive sexual pursuers while woman are positioned as weak, 
passive, and sexually violable.  “A rapist‟s ability to accost a woman verbally, to demand her attention, 
and even to attack her physically depends more on how he positions himself to her socially than it does on 
his allegedly superior physical strength” (Marcus, 1992:390 emphasis added).  She concludes, “rape is 
one of culture‟s many modes of feminizing women” (Marcus, 1992:391).  What fosters rape is not the 
realness of physical bodies but the material realness of discourse that inscribes itself in a woman‟s flesh.  
Sharon Marcus explains that to treat rape as a linguistic fact entails “ask[ing] how the violence of rape is 
enabled by narratives, complexes and institutions which derive their strength not from outright, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discourse, sexually explicit material is by definition sexually exploitative for women.  I share and draw from their analyses here.  
For an interesting discussion of the perspective that pornography cannot objectify women, but must subjectify them (as in 
desiring, valorizing, and willingly pleasing the man) because if women are only sexual objects, they have no power to reject and 
their unconditional acceptance of and insatiable desire for the man is unrepresentable, see Susan Bordo‟s (1993) “Reading the 
Male Body”.     
34 Monique Wittig responds to the often cited critique that with this argument, we are confusing rape practices with images or 
symbols: “for us [women] this discourse is not divorced from the real as it is for semioticians” (1992:25).  She contends that 
images and symbols constitute a discourse and this discourse transmits the message that women are dominated.  In this way, 
images that exploit are not merely elements of a signifying system; they are a facet of the reality of oppression. 
 
28 
 
immutable, unbeatable force but rather from their power to structure our lives as imposing cultural 
scripts” (1992:389).  
 In sum, the relationship of the signified (language, symbol, representation) to the referent (the 
real, the physical) is not merely a functional relationship (a simple translation of form); it is necessarily a 
transformation – a real violence.  In this way, what is represented in the symbolic realm can only be 
translated onto the body by transforming the body.  This translation requires a violent transformation, it is 
an action not just a re-wording, not just a different mode of analysis (as in the discursive interpreted by 
the physical) (Wittig, 1992).  The symbolic then, acts in physically violent ways.35 
   
Violence in Language 
  In Wittig‟s account, the possibility for challenging oppression occurs first with cognitive 
subjectivity; which for her is the instance of the oppressed recognizing their oppression (economic, 
political, and ideological).  The best way for her to move back and forth between these levels of analysis 
(cognitive recognition of exploitation and the exploitation itself) is through language, "Language for a 
writer . . . is a special material because it is the place, the means, the medium for bringing meaning to 
light. . . [but] one sees, one hears only the meaning.  Then isn't meaning language?  Yes, it is language, 
but in its visible and material form, language is form, language is letter" (1992:66-67).  Language for 
Wittig is the visible, material form of meaning, it is the solidification of ideology into an organized 
pattern that we can speak and write.  It is reified discourse.  For Wittig, discourse is an abstraction that 
becomes material through the emergence of language.  Discourse then, falls under the domain of 
materiality.  In this way, Wittig is a radical materialist. 
 In Wittig‟s account, when women enter into language, they can only do so in a way that requires 
the announcement of their gender, of their particularity, as such they are required to announce their 
distance from the universal (the subject).  She focuses her analysis on gendered pronouns.  As soon as one 
writes “I”, he or she appropriates language for the initiation of him or herself into social discourse.  By 
writing “I”, I am assuming the subject position, acting within language to demonstrate my presence 
within it.  As soon as one writes “she”, the reader is startled, required to imagine a gendered body, a 
conditional body, a reference point that is not, cannot be, universal because it is particular, it is marked 
away from the norm.  By contrast, when a reader encounters “he” or “his”, we may continue reading as if 
nothing has happened to this character we are reading about, because indeed nothing has, “his” gender is 
                                                          
35  The following is an example of a traditional interpretation of the symbolic: “. . . with entry into the symbolic order, our 
immersion in the immediacy of the real is forever lost; we are forced to assume an irreducible loss; the word entails the 
(symbolic) murder of the thing, etc.” (Zizek quoted in Smith, 1993:174). By contrast, my argument here is that in the symbolic 
our immersion in the immediacy of the real is solidified, not negated. 
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not marked, it does not call our attention, it does not require a shift in thinking about this subject because 
“he” is the universal human (Wittig, 1992). 
 In this deconstruction of language, women may only speak through the language of domination, 
the language that justifies their subordination. Their only articulable and communicable option is to 
communicate with the oppressors in the language of their own subordination36. Christine Delphy 
confirms: “For example, are „body‟ and „mind‟ divisions of something concrete, or are they entries in 
western dictionaries? And what is the western dictionary, if not the intellectual product of, the 
rationalization for, an oppressive social system” (2005 [1998]:296).  
On the biases inevitably held in language, Ronald Barthes (1979) defines “text” not as the book 
or paper that you hold in your hand but the meanings that are “held in language” and in an intertextual 
field (Smith, 1996).  As we have seen, entry into this intertextual (or discursive) field requires that one 
take up the subject position.  Importantly, in poststructuralist theory, one must take up the subject position 
in such a way that denies the subject-object relationship (in the Cartesian sense) and so individual 
consciousness, perception, and experience are no longer constitutive of our subjective position, 
“Language or discourse, not the objects or events, determine representation” (Smith, 1996:174).  
Experience is an unreliable measure of our reality because it relies on the subject that is already 
discursively determined.  In other words, what “experience” establishes is our location within social 
discourse and not an unmediated route to reality (Smith, 1996). 
 Saussure‟s structuralist theory of linguistics takes as a given the notion that language can by itself 
exist as a subject of inquiry that reveals meanings and relationships.  That is, Saussure believed that 
language can reveal the structurings of the social network without taking into account local and historical 
contexts of speech acts (Smith, 1996).  Dorothy Smith explains this account of linguistics,   
 . . . signifier-signified relations exist independently of actual contexts of speaking-hearing and 
 reading-writing.  Since  people‟s actual practices of talk or writing/reading are already 
 suppressed discursively, their social character is also already cut away . . . . When we speak and 
 write, a discourse speaks through us.  We speak/write/image only within its play of signification.  
 The sign‟s capacity to signify is an effect of the play of difference within language or discourse 
 (1996:176-177).  
 
 Smith‟s answer to the problems of the ahistorical and disembodied nature of poststructuralism is a 
kind of symbolic interactionism.   In her view, practices must occur before discourse has meaning.  
Discourse exists as an imperfect and incomplete avenue to the actual meaning that a speaker/writer 
wishes to extend to a listener/reader.  This is her infusion of real women‟s bodies and lives into the 
symbolic stuff we have to talk about them.  For Smith, reclaiming speech and renaming our experiences 
                                                          
36 In her famous article, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988), Gayatri Spivak refers to this form of oppression as “epistemic 
violence”. 
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forces a new discourse, a new engagement with women‟s lives, a new kind of speech. This engenders a 
kind of subjectivity that accounts for women in their own terms. 
 In agreement with Smith, Bourdieu develops his own account of language that also incorporates 
the discursive struggle for meaning within language with real social contexts that must interpret this 
meaning.  According to Bourdieu, communication, in the interactional sense is much more than 
derivations of meaning posed by contested linguistic descriptors.  Although language is a justifiable 
category of analysis that can and does affect our social world we must not mistake one part for the whole: 
 As competent speakers we are aware of the many ways in which linguistic exchanges can 
 express relations of power.  We are sensitive to the variations in accent, intonation, and 
 vocabulary which reflect different positions in the social hierarchy. . . . We are experts in the 
 innumerable and subtle strategies by which words can be used as instruments of coercion and 
 constraint, as tools of intimidation and abuse, as signs of politeness, condescension and 
 contempt (Thompson, 1991:1). 
 
This is to say that language is a mode of representation (it is discursive) and it requires context and 
interpretation (it is accountable to our social practices).  In writing an introduction to Pierre Bourdieu‟s 
Language and Symbolic Power (1991), Thompson praises Bourdieu for developing an account of 
linguistic phenomena that fully grasps the workings of the social relations of production such that all 
interactive speech “bears traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to reproduce” 
(1991:2).  Language, then, helps to reproduce the material effects of preexisting power and inequality as 
derived from the mode of production; it does not by itself bring into being these effects.  In this book, 
Bourdieu critiques Saussurian linguistics for proposing an entirely “internal” account of linguistics that 
neglects the social and historical practices that brought it into effect.  The larger problem with this type of 
entirely ideological analysis is in positioning language as a self-contained system; as this mistakes an 
abstraction for an autonomous object.  Language is not a homogenous, independently analyzable object, it 
is really an abstraction “of a particular set of linguistic practices which have emerged historically and 
have certain social conditions of existence” (Thompson, 1991:5).  This emergence is often the result of 
extensive conflict engendered by the contradictions and oppressive conditions of specific material 
relations (Thompson, 1991). 
 Building on the notion of accountability to social practices, Bourdieu also draws from Austin‟s 
theory of speech acts and specifically, his notion of performative utterances to demonstrate the limits of 
positing language as a self-contained system.  Such an account of language does not concern itself with 
who has the right to speak and the authority to be listened to and instead focuses on the generation of 
meaning within and between established concepts. In contrast, Bourdieu focuses on the context necessary 
to give such an utterance legitimacy (one must be appropriately authorized to name a ship, or in a specific 
set of circumstances to say “I do” and have it mean what it does).  To claim that language is an entirely 
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self-contained discursive system “is to forget that the authority which utterances have is an authority 
bestowed upon language by factors external to it.  When an authorized spokesperson speaks with 
authority, he or she expresses or manifests this authority, but does not create it” (Thompson, 1001:9).  
Authority of speech cannot be understood outside of relations of power which are generated by existing 
material conditions and modes of power, not abstracted struggles for meaning.   
  
Alternative Ways of Knowing 
 Political theorist Jane Flax provides another example that critiques treating discourse as a closed 
system that does not account for articulations of power.  In her critique of modernity, Flax, who draws 
heavily from Foucault, extends current formulations of gender to read a power move behind all 
presentations of knowledge.  Also drawing from Derrida, Flax echoes poststructuralist claims that 
position order and unity as artificial constructs falsely held up through the expelling of chaos and disorder 
onto the subordinated term which is necessary in all absolute dichotomies.  In the examples of 
culture/nature, man/woman, mind/body, thought/emotion, and subject/object we can see the establishment 
of the primary term is constructed in opposition to the unruliness of the secondary term.  She calls 
attention to the forced order, control, and domination present in this process where excesses and 
abnormalities are pushed outside the boundary and thus silenced and disappeared as the point from which 
to claim dominance.  The heterogeneity and complexity of contemporary life becomes violently and 
forcibly reduced to two falsely elaborated oppositions.   
 Flax (1992) also sets out to critique the Enlightenment ideals present today in liberal politics and 
the pursuit of “objective” science.  She calls into question whether freedom or progress is the necessary 
result of the pursuit of knowledge, whether any claim can actually be objective, and whether reason and 
rationality can operate as innocently divorced from power as they claim.  These premises of 
Enlightenment thought are problematic because they assume knowledge and truth are cohesive, non-
contradictory, autonomous categories.  These premises also assume that language is neutral, the real 
world is stable and able to be captured, knowledge is “innocent” and “clean”, and it is available to all who 
seek it waiting to be “dis-covered” not constructed or formulated (Flax, 1992:457). 
 Her objection lies in the naiveté inherent in these assumptions as has been revealed by factors 
involved in the de-centering of the West; namely, the rise of post-colonial discourse, the rise of the civil 
rights and women‟s movements in the U.S., and the critique of feminism provided by women of color 
(Mann, 2010).  That is, the essential elements present in Enlightenment discourse (self, freedom, 
knowledge, individuality, etc.) have been shown to rest upon racialized, androcentric, and privileged 
frames to support claims of superiority inherent in formulations of Western thought.  Rather than having 
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no relation to history or social position, knowledge then is intimately linked to both and we cannot 
understand any claim to truth independent of relations of power.  What we seek then (what “objective” 
science seeks, what politics seek, what all claims to truth seek), according to Flax, is power, not 
disembodied, free-floating truth.  Truth is the result of our need for justification, not our need for 
explanation.  In order to justify, nature must be reduced, ordered, and artificially constituted, infused with 
meaning and held up as “natural” (Connell, 1987). 
 Similarly, in over twenty years of studying particle physicists, Sharon Traweek (1996) offers 
some evidence that objective knowledge is not free from human (social) constraints.  First, she reminds us 
that because all science is conducted by human beings, all scientific ideas are necessarily social and 
human.  Not only is access to scientific knowledge highly restricted, but the selection of what to study is 
highly contingent on available resources (the more expensive the research is, the less likely it is to be 
replicated).  Her most illuminating finding is that usefulness to scientists is what decides the status of data 
and theories, “Adjudicating which experimental data to take as facts and which theories to take as 
important is a collective process conducted by those who are tacitly empowered with the authority to 
participate . . .  it is not accomplished with definitive findings as to their truth status” (Traweek, 
1996:133).  
She summarizes our ways of knowing up to this point – dyads (subject/object, good/evil), triads 
(thesis/antithesis/synthesis, induction/deduction/abduction), and quads (north/east/south/west, Cartesian 
coordinates).  She also notes branching trees, crawling webs and hierarchicalized “orders” (Linnaeus and 
Darwin).  Our near-obsessive focus on stability, regularity, and distinction is not only unsupported by the 
empirical world, it leads us to close off possibilities that might be true in a way our science cannot 
recognize, “Every way of making sense has its own cognate forms of obsession . . . swirling around with 
Occam‟s razor, slicing away what cannot be categorized, leaves more than order behind” (Traweek, 
1996:135).  Her call to develop a way of knowing that can allow for irregularity, complexity, and 
instability finds its inspiration in poetry, music, and dance.  Christine Delphy in support of this point, “All 
knowledge is the product of a historical situation, whether it is acknowledged or not. . . If it is not 
acknowledged, if knowledge pretends to be neutral, it denies the history that it pretends to explain.  It is 
ideology and not knowledge” (2005[1998]:294). 
Relatedly, Dorothy Smith, as well as other standpoint feminists, levels a number of critiques of 
poststructuralist privileging of discourse that largely ignores history and political struggle.  First, in 
Smith‟s view, the verb “perform” is nominalized (into “performativity”) in Butler‟s work in order to 
create an abstraction and not to attribute any action to the individual subject as would be the case with a 
subject “performing” (Smith, 1996; Thorne, 1995).  Smith critiques this privileging of discourse, 
33 
 
“Language conventions are sedimented historically.  They cannot be attributed to individual intentions.  
The individuated consciousness is structurally displaced by language to reappear as a subject who is an 
effect of language or discourse: „performativity‟ substitutes for intention as the originator of action” 
(Smith, 1996:180).  What disappears here is the social, the interaction, the relationship among people: 
The social, conceived as the ongoing concerting of activities among people, is reduced to a solo 
performance, such that promising, marrying, or launching a ship (Austin, 1962) is an act of an 
individual, a problem replicated in John Searle‟s (1969) theory of speech acts: „in speech act 
theory, a speech act is conceived as a closed totality where the intention corresponds to the act 
itself‟. The social remains unexplicated, even unnoticed (Smith, 1996: 180).   
 
What Smith wishes to capture with the term “social” is all interactive meaning and nuance that 
cannot be adequately referenced in discourse.  She finds a solution in George Herbert Mead‟s (1938, 
1947) theory of “symbolic communication” where meaning is interactionally determined, “knowledge [is] 
grounded socially in an interindividual territory constituted by the language–mediated organization of the 
social act” (Smith, 1996:182).  Although writing before poststructuralism, Mead moves from the idea of a 
contained symbolic system of signs to symbolic communication, a symbolic that exists not in “text” but in 
the space between the speaker and the listener.  Also compelling to Smith is Valentin Volosinov‟s (1973) 
account of meaning as the field which exists between an individual psyche and language:    
[A] word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is 
meant.  As a word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and 
listener, addresser and addressee.  Each and every word expresses the „one‟ in relation to the 
„other‟.  I give myself verbal shape from another‟s point of view (Volosinov, 1973:86 quoted in 
Smith, 1996:183 emphases in original). 
 
In this view, an individual becomes a subject not through entrance into language or discourse but from the 
interaction with an/other that language structures and mediates.  The third account noted by Smith is 
Mikhail Bakhtin‟s (1981, 1986) idea of meaning as the struggle between what we wish to say and what 
language has structured for us that is sayable, “[L]anguage, for the individual consciousness, lies on the 
border between oneself and the other.  The word in language is half someone else‟s.  It becomes „one‟s 
own‟ only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the 
word” (Bakhtim, 1981:293-294 quoted in Smith, 1996:184). 
The above accounts of language do not place the entirety of meaning within discourse; instead 
meaning is located in dialogue, interaction, between self and other, within the exchanges between people 
in social relations.  Drawing from these perspectives, Smith understands that representation does not 
occur between a subject and object, instead it occurs in a subject-subject-object relationship that keeps 
objects (names) in the realm of the social, everyday interactions between people.  Objects and the words 
we use to refer to them occur for Smith in a “dialogic production” (1996:188).  In this dialogic or 
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interactional sense, the social universe produces meaning which is always more than that which is spoken.  
“Referring is not achieved wholly within language; it relies on a differentiation in the world beyond any 
given utterance; it is a moment in a social act in which the category used by the speaker provides 
something like a set of instructions for the hearer to locate and recognize an object that fits the category” 
(1996:192).  As language becomes grounded in interaction, it exists as a bridge between the psychological 
and the social.  Language (and by extension, discourse) becomes contextualized in this manner.  This is 
Smith‟s understanding of the inadequacy of locating all meaning entirely within the discursive realm and 
a possible method for relating social practices to ideology and discourse. 
Whereas Butler and other poststructuralists would contend that there are no subjects other than 
those constituted by discourse and that nothing outside of patriarchal misogynist, racist, capitalist culture 
can be said by a subject position constructed within these confines, for Smith and other materialist 
feminists, such a view is antagonistic to any project of social justice, as it is inherently anti-feminist and 
politically nihilist (Moi, 1988; Nussbaum, 2000).  The only practical response from a group that is 
oppressed by this set of economic, political, and ideological relations is to speak from their own 
experience.  Although constructed and confined by their oppression, privileging one‟s own socially 
devalued position is itself resistance.  Hence, Dorothy Smith (1993) would say yes, there are subjects 
outside of discourse.  In fact her critique of postmodernism argues that women‟s shared experience gives 
rise to a critique of the very discourse that does not allow it: “Thus we came to recognize our oppression 
as women in discovering a politics, forms of representation, and a poetics, in and through discoveries we 
made in the collaborative telling of our experience.  In creating a discourse of women, we created 
ourselves, women, as subjects of that discourse” (Smith, 1993:184).  She creates a space from which 
women may speak back to the discourse that excludes them, not as object or other but as subject, as 
agentic women.  “Speaking from experience has the power to disrupt discourse, not simply because the 
feminine speaks and when it speaks it disrupts, but because women speaking their experience as women, 
speak from where they are in their sexed bodies as they live.  Discourse is surprised, has to rewrite itself, 
has to learn, has to know other than what it did” (Smith, 1993:189).   
She brings back into analysis the social relations within which discourse is produced, operates 
and is organized: “Conceiving discourse as actual practices and activities arising in specific local 
historical contexts and under definite conditions, rather than as bounded by the realm of meaning, leads us 
„naturally‟ to its articulation in a political economy” (Smith, 1990:207).  To do otherwise would leave 
unanalyzed the lived world of women where “there is no history, there is no work, there is no economy; 
there are no wars, no misery, no violence, no rape, no watching your children starve.  If there is a lived 
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world, we may not speak of it” (Smith, 1993: 89).  The lived world of women then, presents a challenge 
to poststructuralist accounts of the “othering” of women by incorporating our own bodies and lives.   
Having discussed some theoretical critiques posed to poststructuralism by the unpacking of 
power, the acknowledgement of human/social embeddedness, the significance of the interactional 
moment, and the lived reality of women‟s social experiences, I shall now examine a number of empirical 
studies that illuminate how actual everyday, bodily practices interface with conceptions of gender to 
further explore the intricate relationship between discourses of gender and non-discursive manifestations 
of gender (practices). 
 
Empirical Cases 
 Feminine Gendered Habitus is Learned 
Not only is poststructuralist analysis of the “othering” of women unable to deal well with history 
– with gender relations in qualitatively different historical social formations – but also it does not deal 
well with time in the sense of an individual‟s life course.  For example, in her influential essay, 
“Throwing Like a Girl” Iris MarionYoung (2005 [1990]) extends the work of Merleau-Ponty, a 
philosopher famous for removing the seat of subjectivity from consciousness (the mind) and placing it 
inside the body itself.  Merleau-Ponty describes the act of coming into subjectivity as the body acting on 
the world, thereby giving meaning to the subject (person) as it (the body) begins to relate to its 
surroundings.  Therefore, meaning is possible for the subject only insofar as the body is able to approach, 
interact with, and direct the physical world.  As the body brings its surroundings into relationship with 
itself, the self (subjectivity) becomes possible.  In this sense, borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, Young 
understands the body as the “first locus of intentionality” (Young, 2005:36). 
Young takes this theoretical framework and combines it with de Beauvoir‟s account of woman‟s 
place as “Other” (or the denial of subjectivity) in a patriarchal society.  De Beauvoir contrasts the “Other” 
(woman) with the “self” (man) who alone can occupy the subject position because of the contrast 
provided by the object position.  De Beauvoir understands the position of women in a sexist culture as a 
fundamental contradiction between the subject and object positions, a required social positioning that is 
learned at a specific time in a girl‟s life.   
De Beauvoir in her groundbreaking feminist text The Second Sex (1989 [1952]), finds the period 
of adolescence to be the most turbulent and alienating for a girl, as this is when the full weight of cultural 
prescriptions of femininity descend upon her.  Up until adolescence, girls are encouraged to explore the 
world, engage in physical activities with boys, and satisfy their curiosities.  De Beauvoir‟s 
phenomenological framework understands this active, exploring pre-pubescent girl as a subject.  
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According to this theoretical perspective, a person‟s ability to act on the world is what gives him/her the 
idea of him/herself.  The active self (or subject) is established in relation to the (body‟s) ability to 
manipulate the physical world; by exploring, manipulating and acting upon one‟s physical environment, a 
person comes to recognize herself as agentic.  For de Beauvoir then, girls are subjects before they become 
“gendered”37 during adolescence when female body comportment is imposed upon them.  What 
“gendering” for a girl means then, is a subject disabling herself.  According to Young (2005 [1990]), as 
girls learn to appropriate adult femininity, what they are actually learning is to restrict their movements, 
withhold their strength, and approach other people and things with timidity.  Femininity, then, is the 
process by which a subject (girl) becomes an object (woman) through inhibitions to her body.  While 
written before the rise of poststructuralism, this type of analysis is, nevertheless, a critique of how 
poststructuralism (as a form of discursive analysis, operating in an abstract domain) ignores an 
individual‟s life course.  De Beauvoir offers gender as a process that occurs in stages, has boundaries 
before and after its transformative process, and ultimately as one that is tied to a woman‟s life journey and 
everyday social practices and not an abstraction divorced from bodies.   
 Young takes this concept of de Beauvoir‟s and applies it to women‟s accomplishment of physical 
tasks like throwing a ball, lifting something heavy, or twisting an object with force.  Young applies de 
Beauvoir‟s theory to explain why a woman tends to duck from a ball being thrown toward her rather than 
move her body to make contact with it (as a man would).  Similarly, she explains that when twisting 
something women tend to employ the hand and wrist rather than the arm and shoulder (as men do), which 
are not only much more powerful body locales, they are also required to accomplish the task most 
efficiently.  Young38 describes the tendency for girls to act on the world in such a way as “inhibited 
intentionality” or as a subject unable to achieve full subjectivity.  She believes this is a consequence of 
viewing one‟s self as an object (or more correctly, as the outcome of the discursive denial of viewing her 
self as a subject).  From a poststructuralist viewpoint, this learning of a gendered habitus is the 
materialization of a discourse that dominates and violently excludes women.  
 “As Young emphasizes, the feminine body is constituted as that which is alien to the female 
subject” (Cahill, 2000:53).  Her body is what impedes, it is her obstacle, it is frustratingly weak and 
ineffective and separates her from her need to act on the world (to become a subject).  A girl learning 
femininity learns to be afraid and immobilized by her social position, she learns to fear physical violation 
and visual consumption and therefore she reins in her body for protection.  This is an excellent example 
                                                          
37 Poststructuralist theory has refined this concept (indeed, some might say abolished).  Importantly, de Beauvoir‟s analysis was 
radical enough for her time and current theoretical attempts to understand the objectification of women owe her a great debt.  
Technically though, poststructuralist theory (see Butler, 1993) positions all subjects unintelligible before they are gendered. 
38 Again, gender is not the only way bodies are characterized and the femininity that Young and de Beauvoir report on is 
specifically white, middle-class, heterosexual, gender-conforming and globally privileged.  
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of discourse acting on the body in the context of the physical practices by which fear produces 
feminization.  Our culture‟s various techniques of feminization also tend to buttress the rape script, since 
the femininity they induce “makes a feminine woman the perfect victim of sexual aggression” (Marcus, 
1992:393).  Women can only become subjects according to Marcus, by becoming subjects of fear; which 
is the necessary counterpart to positioning women as the objects of violence. Subjectivity is possible only 
in the full grasp of one‟s violability through its logical manifestation, fear.  This socially-established “rape 
script” assigns us a subject position (one of action) in relation to fear.  Women then, understand their 
subjectivity in fear and learn to associate it with immobility and silence.  Paradoxically, we come to 
identify with a state of subjectivity that is exactly the dissolution of subjectivity (Marcus, 1992:394).   
As developed by Sharon Marcus, the power in fighting back is the power accorded to a woman as 
she moves from a subject of fear to a subject of violence.  According to Marcus, exualized violence is 
specifically not understood as subject-subject violence before the law nor within a typical rape scenario.  
Sexualized violence is not a fight wherein each participant expects violence from and doles out violence 
to his opponent.  Instead, it is an act of terrorism wherein men demand from a woman‟s body the logical 
conclusion of the feminine script – passivity, submission and a sexually receptive response to sexual 
aggression.  The act of responding to aggression with aggression positions a woman as a subject, in 
relation to her own action, in the primal position of defending one‟s self.  It is the rejection of the social 
script that allows her body to be violated.  This very physical act is so powerful because it challenges 
discourse and it does so with her physical body (McCaughey, 1998). 
 
Feminine Gendered Habitus can be Unlearned   
Building on this framework, through an ethnographic study of a wide variety of women‟s self-
defense instruction, McCaughey (1998, 1997) finds what she terms “physical feminism”.  In martial arts 
studios, padded-attacker courses, aerobics studios and on firing ranges, McCaughey documents the 
“metamorphosis” of leaving behind the disabling requirements of femininity in favor of powerful and 
often violent strategies for a woman to effectively defend herself against attack.  She convincingly frames 
the process of a woman learning her physical boundaries and how to defend them as the active 
deconstruction of femininity (more correctly, the disabling of the disabling effects of femininity).  Her 
definition of embodied femininity relies heavily on Young‟s phenomenological analysis of girls‟ body 
comportment as reactive and hesitant.  This logic has radical implications not only for the integrity of a 
woman‟s body but also for her intellectual integrity as “the general lack of confidence that we frequently 
have about our cognitive or leadership abilities is traceable in part to an original doubt of our body‟s 
capacity” (Young, 2005 [1990]:156). 
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In this sense gender is for women particular bodily practices and comportment that marks a 
person violable, vulnerable, and defenseless.  Self-defense then, becomes an explosive and dynamic 
undoing of this process of female subjects disabling themselves.  Significantly, as women learn self-
defense, they learn to undo their feminine inhibitions not just theoretically or cognitively, but physically, 
in the immediacy of their own bodies (McCaughey, 1998).  This is an important way to see the operations 
of gender ideology manifested not only in social interaction, discourse, and the larger social structure, but 
also at the level of the body (that femininity is the materialization of gendered oppression).  For her, the 
body is undoubtedly a discursive text, but also the material upon which male dominance enforces its 
authority, therefore a woman‟s body is an important place to begin to contest both social and physical 
victimization with physical bodies (McCaughey, 1998).  This is a challenge to women‟s social position 
made by her bodily practices. 
  It seems that because these “transformed” women do not permanently upset the established 
heteronormative order, the transformation that takes place for a woman who learns physical defense 
might not be as radical as McCaughey claims.  “[W]omen‟s refusal of a status of helpless, sexually 
available objects can be disconcerting.  To become a self-defenser is to become a gender transgression” 
(1997:128).  What happens here might be an objectified, heteronormative woman temporarily leaving 
behind the object position as she acts out defensive moves powerfully and violently (in these moments 
she claims the subject position).  We must assume that these women then return to the object position 
(and leave behind the subject position) because they are able to lead lives unencumbered by harassment 
and the threat of violence that is always present in the lives of persons who exist outside of gender 
normativity (that self-defense is not recognized as gender transgression)39. 
 Self-defensers seem to be subjected to the threat of violence as heteronormative women and then 
for a few moments protect themselves from the actual manifestation of this violence, but they do not 
remain here, in this position where the imposition of violence on a (heteronormative) woman‟s body is 
contested with her own body.  We know this because in this space, where a woman protects herself from 
the violence doled out to (heteronormative) women, she does so as a heteronormative woman40.  What 
                                                          
39 McCaughey would disagree with this assertion.  In her book, Real Knockouts (1997), she recounts many instances where 
women who participated along side her in various self-defense classes announced to the class a newfound ability to verbally 
respond to a heckler, talk about a past instance of abuse, or critique mainstream media movie depictions of feminine women‟s 
physical incapacity.  She noticed that even she seemed to walk differently when alone, with more purpose and force.  She 
understands these newfound instances of subjectivity as “gender transgressions” whereas I do not.  To qualify as a gender 
transgression, in my view, is to leave behind the privileges of gender conformativity, to be unrecognizable as a feminine woman, 
and to accept the consequences of not cohering to the heteronormative binary. 
40 In using this phrase, I do not wish to conflate oppression along the axis of gender with oppression along the axis of sexuality.  
In contesting McCaughey‟s claim that self-defensers are gender transgressions, I mean to highlight the embeddedness of 
heteronormativity within our concept of femininity.  I believe this is not only a fair critique of her work but an important 
demonstration of the limits of how we can physically challenge discourse if we wish to remain culturally intelligible.   
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she does not do is live the rest of her life as say, a gender non-conforming woman (the refusal of 
heteronormative femininity) as this continued embodiment lies outside the constructed heteronormative 
binary and this would subject her to a different type of violence.  McCaughey has found the refusal of the 
violence directed toward heteronormative femininity, she has not found the refusal of heteronormative 
femininity itself as she claims.  “What feminists talk about interrupting – femininity – self-defensers 
practice interrupting: They enact the deconstruction of femininity” (1997:90).  Her self-defensers do not 
so much unlearn femininity as they contest (with kicks and punches) its implications (the violability of 
women). 
 Importantly, McCaughey succeeds in locating the struggle for dignity and subjectivity in the 
body.  Fighting bodies warding off violence is a powerful visual image that captures an embodied subject 
struggling to remain so.  Also, her analysis positions the transformation of the female body (learning self-
defense) as occurring before (indeed causing) the subsequent transformation of the woman‟s 
consciousness.  That is, women learn to fight in high adrenaline situations, which only later cause them to 
consider what has prevented them from fighting back all along.  In this analysis, a woman‟s body has 
brought her to knowledge.  Fighting back is a fully embodied articulation of subjectivity in that the 
physical body is resisting discourse. 
 McCaughey, drawing on Marcus, clarifies that the physical and sexual violence that men inflict 
upon women is not subject-subject violence between equals.  Rather, it is a demonstration that women are 
incapable of an appropriate response to aggression.  The reasonable assumption here is that a fully 
embodied subject would react to attempts of physical coercion and intimidation with aggressive physical 
defense.  McCaughey has convincingly demonstrated the removal of subjectivity that occurs with 
femininity in that feminine women are not confrontational or aggressive, they take up as little space as 
possible with their bodies and voices.  In this way, we may see that if a man is physically or sexually 
violent with a feminine woman, he is a subject acting on an object.  He does not see her as a competitor in 
a physical challenge, he sees her as a body removed from subjectivity.  Because a feminine body is the 
materialization of unequal power, male domination, and compulsory heterosexuality, learning a different 
kind of gender habitus (McCaughey calls this unlearning a feminine habitus and replacing it with a 
“fighting habitus” [1997:95]) enables a critique of discourse through the materialization of its effects on a 
woman‟s body.   
 
When Gendered Habitus is Incongruent with Gender Identity  
Relatedly, studies that document the transformative process of transsexuals moving across the 
gender binary are able to shed light on the significance of the physical practices of femininity (or 
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gendered habitus).  Schrock, Reid, and Boyd (2005) found transsexuality could be explained in terms of 
moving from one position to the other, leaving the gender binary intact while transforming the body.  The 
authors conducted in-depth interviews with nine white, middle-class, male-to-female transsexuals in order 
to reveal the ways in which born men do “bodywork” in the transformative process of becoming women.  
“Bodywork” is broadly defined in this study so as to include unlearning the habits (gender habitus) of 
moving and speaking like men (voice inflection, body comportment) as well as mastering the difficult art 
of women‟s make-up and fashion.  The interviewees recounted much time and effort monitoring their 
bodily movement and speech.  This self-monitoring led them to different experiences in role-taking, 
practical consciousness and reactions from others.  Adopting women‟s clothing also became a way to 
“become a woman”.  As one interviewee explained, walking like a woman was much easier when she 
wore women‟s shoes and sitting like a woman was easier when she wore skirts, because she didn‟t have 
to make such a “conscious effort” and the clothes and shoes helped to “reinforce it a lot more” (Schrock, 
et al., 2005:324).  The authors find that as the interviewees learned to retrain their bodies, they began to 
assume a woman‟s perspective (the practices altered their subjectivity).   
Echoing the transformative process experienced by women in self-defense classes (McCaughey, 
1998), repetitive practices of certain bodily movements, comportment, and voice became installed into 
“bodily memory” (McCaughey‟s term).  This newly formed “memory” is inscribed in the body itself, 
becoming “naturalized” as an unthinking part of practical consciousness.  Because the interviewees were 
raised under the rubric of hegemonic masculinity where women are “objects” situated under the “male 
gaze”, interviewees had to move themselves from the position of those who employ the gaze to those 
whose self-monitoring and policing are the result of being subjected to this gaze.  Interestingly, shifting 
oneself into the object position was eventually met with a feeling of greater authenticity, relaxation, and a 
freedom to be who they “really” are (whereas in McCaughey‟s study, freedom was acquired from the 
reverse process – unlearning femininity, or moving from the object to subject position).   
“Authenticity” for the transsexuals refers to their newly constructed bodies matching up with 
cultural prescriptions for behavior.  The participants adopted the label “woman” as their core identity 
before they embarked on a systematic remaking of their bodies.  Seeking to have this (already present) 
sense of self affirmed in interactions with other people, the interviewees worked to remake their bodies to 
achieve “authenticity” or a consistent sense of self.  The authors present their findings as evidence that 
contradicts postmodernist/poststructuralist theories that attempt to reduce the body to a discursive text or 
a “sociopolitical construction” as well as Butler‟s poststructuralist claim that “the body is material 
because language, which constitutes the body, is material . . . bodies themselves are cultural by-products” 
(Schrock et al., 2005:315).  The authors accuse Butler (and other poststructuralist feminists) of failing to 
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acknowledge the materiality (physicality, “realness”) of the body and pose their findings as evidence to 
the contrary41.   
The authors have two main findings: that the women they interviewed used their bodies as a 
resource to represent or communicate their already present core identity as women, and unexpectedly, 
remaking their bodies altered their subjectivity (with constrictive movements, more smiling, less talking, 
and so on they came to adopt a woman‟s perspective).  That is, these participants as born men were 
certain enough of their core female identity to undergo physical and surgical transformations, but it was 
only upon learning femininity that these (already self-identified) women came to inhabit a woman‟s 
“perspective”.  This finding effectively links transformations of the body (here, adopting female body 
comportment) with an altered practical consciousness.   
This study also offers a powerful critique of the poststructuralist emphasis on discursively 
produced bodies but from a different perspective, that of gender identity.  These men possessed an already 
present gender identity that conflicted with the social reading of their bodies.  They subsequently 
transformed their bodies in order to experience a discursive alignment between their bodies and a social 
reading or interpretation of their bodies.  This speaks to the power of discourse and the pain individuals 
experience when they feel socially misrecognized or invalidated.  However, discourse cannot account for 
the existence or construction of an identity that discourse itself fails to recognize or actively denies (like 
in this study, individuals born with men‟s bodies but who socially identify as female).  What a materialist 
analysis can do in such an instance is to highlight how the learning of feminine bodily practices (gender 
habitus) is the major agent allowing (producing) discursive alignment (coherence between identity and 
social recognition) as the body is being transformed.  Here, incorporating femininity into a transforming 
body solidifies discursive coherence.  In this instance, a feminine gendered habitus was actively sought 
and acquired despite the subjects having been raised male, which compromises the poststructuralist notion 
of a discursively produced subject. 
Another study, this time regarding female-to-male transsexuals, also uses the framework of a 
gender habitus to describe sex category as a response to gender.  However, in this case it is the embodied 
belief and social practice of masculinity (gender identity) that individuals possessed before seeking a 
transformation of their bodies – they identified with a masculine gender habitus and felt most comfortable 
                                                          
41 This summary of Butler‟s argument is not quite accurate as she clarifies in Bodies That Matter (1993): “This is not to say that 
the materiality of bodies is simply and only a linguistic effect which is reducible to a set of signifiers.  Such a distinction 
overlooks the materiality of the signifier itself.  Such an account also fails to understand materiality as that which is bound up 
with signification from the start . . . . To posit by way of language a materiality outside of language is still to posit that 
materiality, and the materiality so posited will retain that positing as its constitutive condition . . . . Can language simply refer to 
materiality, or is language also the very condition under which materiality may be said to appear?” (p.30-31).  Butler then does 
not fail to account for materiality, she only makes the point that materiality cannot be understood as outside of discursively 
produced language and concepts since language and concepts are the only ways we have to think and talk about what might fall 
outside or exist prior to language and concepts!   
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after they transitioned to male.  This is different from the Schrock et al. (2005) study cited above where 
individuals possessed an embodied belief of femaleness (sex) before pursuing a body transformation – 
they identified with the female sex and felt most comfortable after they learned a feminine gender habitus.  
Interestingly, the former study positions a discursively misaligned sexual identity as precipitating a sex 
change whereas the latter study positions a discursively misaligned gender identity as precipitating a sex 
change42.  This speaks to the complex ways gender identities, sexual identities and discourses about sexed 
and gendered bodies interact.   
In the latter study, interviewing 18 female-to-male trans-identified people using semistructured 
interviews, Dozier (2005) critiques existing theories of gender through a transsexual framework.  
Confirming the theoretical work of other trans-identified scholars, she highlights the importance of the 
body in transsexual experience.  The author notes, trans people provide an important critique to social 
constructionist theories of gender that rely too heavily on social interaction43, a framework that denies not 
only the material “realness” of the body, but also the persistence of an underlying gender identity44.  The 
incongruence of this underlying gender identity with one‟s physical body is a source of constant tension 
for the (pre-transitioned) transsexual.  This “paradox” of gender identity – socially constructed yet present 
outside of social situations, is an important space to understand the workings of the social on our physical 
bodies.  Again, this study presents evidence as to the limits of what discourse can explain. 
In the process of transitioning from female to male, Dozier‟s interviewees found that their 
behavior did not change as much as other people‟s assignment of meaning to their behavior did.  For 
example, when a butch-looking woman raises her voice and tries to get a saleswoman‟s attention in a 
store, this is something quite different from a man doing the same thing.  Also surprising was the amount 
of conversational space and deferment granted to them from other people as they began to be socially 
“read” as men.  Dozier finds that when sex category is unclear or likely to be contested, there is a 
tendency to rely on stereotypically gendered behaviors.  She also found the reverse to be true, that when 
sex category is not contested, that is, after hormone treatment and chest surgery allowed them to be 
                                                          
42 To clarify, the men in the Schrock et al. (2005) study pursued female bodies to achieve greater coherence between an already 
present sexual identity of female and resultant social interaction.  This is a different situation to what Dozier (2005) finds in her 
study; that participants pursued a male body to achieve greater coherence between an already present gender identity of 
masculinity and resultant social interaction. 
43 Dozier is specifically referencing symbolic interactionism which proposes a core self with an individual actor in the modernist 
sense; it also assumes that identity arises in response to social interaction. This perspective is not to be confused with radical 
social constructionist theories like Butler‟s and Foucault‟s that propose identity is a result not of interaction but of discourse 
which fundamentally displaces the individual actor in the post-modernist sense.  
44 I do not mean to essentialize gender identity, or to leave it entirely in a psychological realm.  I mean only to point out its 
existence.  In doing so, I will borrow Judith Halberstam‟s descriptive phrase of gender identity - it is a “deep or internal identity 
effect” (1999:[21] emphasis added).  By naming gender identity an “effect” she remains safely within the poststructuralist 
position of how identity is constituted.  This definition is clever, but it does not overcome the difficulty of explaining a 
psychological phenomenon with a social-structural concept. 
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quickly and easily recognized as men in public spaces, the interviewees were able to relax any 
hypermasculine behavior they developed as women trying to ward off associations with femininity.   
An automatic assumption of maleness widened the range of behaviors the interviewees felt 
comfortable with because their underlying gender identity was confirmed in interactions with other 
people.  However, because the context within which they were displaying their masculinity (“doing 
gender”) shifted as they transitioned from female to male (they were “doing sex” differently), their 
behavior was interpreted quite differently.  In this way, the author presents a balance between sex 
category and gendered behavior – gender does not arise from the social requirements of one‟s sex 
category, as many gender theorists assert (see West and Zimmerman, 1987).  Instead, sex provides the 
context from which to interpret gendered behavior, gendered meaning of behavior is contingent upon 
readable sex category.  This demonstrates the importance of how the physical body (comportment) is read 
in a social, interpretive situation by others and how this in turn affects the gendered practices of 
individuals.     
  Convincingly, Dozier presents her analysis as a way to understand the large proportion of 
participants in her study (and other studies) of FTMs (female-to-male transsexuals) who after 
transitioning change sexual orientation (women sexually attracted to other women become men sexually 
attracted to other men).  She posits that the socially and sexually devalued position imprecated in a sexual 
relationship between a man and a woman is untenable for pre-transitioned FTMs.  The interviewees 
needed their masculinity to be recognized (first by a femme lesbian, then by an effeminate gay man), 
which is not possible when a woman is sexually relating to a man.  Skillfully, Dozier is able to 
demonstrate how sex (male or female) is an outcome of gendered identity (the expression of masculinity 
is incoherent with a female body; a change of sex is required to establish discursive coherence).     
After transitioning from masculine women to masculine men, the participants in this study found 
their behavior was read by others with much more importance.  The now masculine men were given more 
conversational room, physical space, and respect in general and some even found that women were afraid 
of them.  This suggests the representation of masculinity is fundamentally the bodily comportment and 
practices that reflect power and at times, the ability to intimidate.  In this study, masculinity originated as 
the masculine gendered practices that born women used to express who they really were.  An analysis of 
discourse has little to say about the possibility of this scenario.  Similarly, a discursive positioning of 
subjects cannot account for the incoherence between an individual‟s gender identity and physical body.  
This speaks to the power of gendered habitus and its relationship to discursive coherence (masculine men 
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are important and generate fear, masculine women are laughable45).  This demonstrates the limits of a 
poststructuralist analysis that focuses on discursively produced bodies and neglects instances where 
misalignment occurs.   
Another study confirms the reinscription of the sexual binary (man or woman) among those best 
posed to challenge it.  In a nonrandom sample of self-identified masculine-to-feminine transgendered 
individuals (hereafter transgenderists), Gagne, Tewsbury, and McGaughey (1997) completed 65 
semistructured, in-depth interviews, and observed the persistence of heteronormative ideology concerning 
gender, even within communities whose practices violate these norms.  For example, most cross-dressers 
in their sample (men who wore women‟s clothing for an erotic experience or to express their feminine 
side) held very traditional ideas regarding sex and gender.  The authors note, “they were masculine, 
heterosexual men who, when dressed as women, wished to be perceived as feminine, heterosexual female 
persons” (Gagne, et al. 1997).   
The authors also noted a common “final rite of passage” among the volunteers in their study – an 
individual‟s initial social emergence dressed as a woman (but before sexual reassignment surgery).  
Because transgendered individuals are considered marginal members of gay and queer subculture, they 
can use those locations to “experiment” with new identities.  Venturing out into a gay bar as a (somewhat) 
obvious man dressed as a woman, they will have their first experience being treated “like ladies” (Gagne 
et al. 1997).  In this setting, they are likely to meet a category of men termed “punters” (male prostitutes 
that are experimenting with their own sexual orientation) who happily have sex with men dressed as 
women.  Transgenderists frame this experience as a welcome opportunity to explore the sexual practices 
of heterosexual femininity. These social-sexual encounters are a highly-anticipated rite of passage for 
transgenderists eager to assume an authentic female heterosexual identity.   
The authors note that socially constructed heteronormative prescriptions for behavior are so 
potent that individuals are more likely to believe they were born with the wrong genitals rather than 
confront the possibility of challenging the gender binary.  The authors echo Dozier‟s claim by holding 
their data as evidence that it is gender (masculinity or femininity) that individuals tend to describe as their 
“core” sense of self which in turn determines sex (male body or female body).  Similar to Dozier, they 
posit the result of sex from gender as inevitable in that changing sexes is what allowed the participants of 
their study to feel most “normal” and “authentic” (discursively aligned).  This is further evidence as to the 
limits of a poststructuralist explanation where everything is rooted in a radical notion of social 
                                                          
45 Most often, participants reported that harassment radically declined after they were easily socially read as men.  This was, 
however, dependent on the assumption of whiteness and the appearance of sufficient masculinity on a male body; as small, 
feminine men reported feeling more vulnerable to attack after transitioning and Black men reported that they were subjected to 
increased surveillance and rude treatment after transitioning. 
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constructionism.  The ability of transgenderists to move within the gender binary and their unique 
perspective on what constitutes heterosexual femininity (that it may authentically be embodied by a born 
man) presents a challenge to a discourse that produces subjects to support established interests and cannot 
adequately address the emergence of individuals that are discursively incoherent. 
  
Masculine Gender Habitus as Learned Violence 
 The following four studies demonstrate in different ways the constitutive violence, regulation, 
and reliance on intersecting dimensions of identity that are present in prevailing accounts of masculinity.  
In her book, Bad Boys: Public Schools and the Making of Black Masculinity (2004), Ann Ferguson offers 
an ethnographic analysis of the role that public schools play in producing a simultaneously disempowered 
and feared Black masculinity46.  For boys, the enactment of masculinity brings the rewards of a good 
gender performance, namely, “a thoroughly embodied display of physical and social power . . . while the 
consequences of an inadequate or bad performance are significant, ranging from ostracism and 
stigmatization to imprisonment and death” (Ferguson, 2004:171).  She notes the importance of physical 
displays of power: “Fighting is a mechanism for preparing masculinized bodies through the playful 
exercise of bodily moves and postures and the routinized rehearsal of sequences and chains of stances of 
readiness, attack, and defense” (Ferguson, 2004:187).  She makes a distinction among boys from different 
class locations; for middle-class boys, fighting takes place in institutionalized arenas, with school and 
community funding and support, while for working-class boys it happens spontaneously, on the street, in 
unsanctioned locations.  “Though class makes a difference in when, how, and under what conditions it 
takes place, fighting is the hegemonic representation of masculinity.  Inscribed in the male body . . . is the 
potential for this unleashing of physical power” (Ferguson, 2004:191).  She concludes, “Fighting is the 
emblematic ritual performance of male power.  Participation in this ritual for boys and for men is not an 
expression of deviant, anti-social behavior but is profoundly normative, a thoroughly social performance” 
(Ferguson, 2004:193) 47.  By highlighting the linkage between socially recognized masculinity and the 
physical practices of aggression and defense, Ferguson merges the abstractness in the production of Black 
masculinity with the socially necessary interactive moment of interpretation.  In discussing the physical 
                                                          
46 I am unsure of the ramifications involved in switching to a discussion of Black masculinity without accounting for the ways in 
which this differs from hegemonic (white, middle-class, heterosexual, etc.) masculinity.  I have included Ferguson‟s book here 
because she presents a nuanced analysis of the ways race, class, gender, and sexuality intersect in the lives of poor and working –
class Black boys within the public school system in the U.S.  The parallel I draw here is not to erase the significance of racial 
oppression in the lives of these boys; rather, it is to demonstrate one similarity in the construction of white and Black 
masculinities which is the reliance of both on gender, heterosexuality, and class to orchestrate a social position of power. 
47 Ferguson notes that girls do fight in school (at much lower frequencies) but when they do, it is considered an aberration, and as 
resulting from the girl‟s individuality, not explainable by or reflective of her “femaleness” (2004:191). 
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preparations and contexts involved in unleashing one‟s physical power, she effectively links masculinity 
as a discursive concept with the physical practices associated with embodied power and violence.   
  Her findings are echoed in Kimmel and Mahler‟s (2003) article, “Adolescent Masculinity, 
Homophobia, and Violence: Random School Shootings, 1982-2001”.  In this study, the authors offer a 
link between retaliatory violence and accusations of inadequate performances of masculinity.  The authors 
find that all of the individuals in their national study of school shooters who had committed random acts 
of gun violence were adolescent white boys who had been teased relentlessly for inadequate gender 
performances.  While none of the boys identified as gay, they were all teased with homophobic insults, a 
method of social ostracism that spoke not to their perceived sexual orientation, but to the perceived failure 
of male performances of masculinity.  These boys were either honor role students, involved in theatre or 
band, or otherwise “nonathletic, geekish or weird” (Kimmel and Mahler, 2003:1445).  In other words, the 
shooters were targeted and ridiculed for their failed masculinity.  The shooters responded with a 
retaliatory measure that is the very embodiment of masculinity – aggressive violence, which was likely a 
response to the repeated allegations of failed masculinity.  The authors conclude: “these boys are not 
psychopathological deviants but rather overconformists to a particular normative construction of 
masculinity, a construction that defines violence as a legitimate response to a perceived humiliation” 
(2003:1440).  This is evidence not only of the embeddedness of heterosexuality within masculinity (as it 
is in femininity) but also to the ways our actions are interpreted and judged adequate or not through social 
interaction.     
  In a related study that also documents how stigmatizing accusations can police acceptable limits 
of gender behavior, and that they in fact an effective controlling mechanism among similarly situated 
individuals within the social structure, Pascoe (2005) presents an ethnographic study of a predominantly 
white, working-class suburban high school.  In her book, Dude, You’re a Fag (2005), Pascoe finds what 
she terms the “fag discourse” by applying poststructuralist theory to high school boys‟ joking behavior48.  
The ubiquity with which the boys in her study lobbed the insult “fag” at each other indicates its power to 
regulate and enforce gender normativity within adolescent male peer groups.  Boys became vulnerable to 
accusations of being a “fag” if they were too emotional, cared too much about their appearance or other 
people, or failed to demonstrate physical and/or sexual prowess.  In this way, accusations of “fag” 
become a regulatory mechanism through which boys police their own and their peers‟ behavior, ensuring 
they and their friends perform an acceptable masculinity congruent with gender norms.  
                                                          
48 Pascoe does not frame it in this way; she believes the abject position represented in the “fag discourse” is essentially a 
psychological expulsion which gets played out as a discursive struggle.  For support of her interpretation, see Julia Kristeva‟s 
Powers of Horror.  For simplicity, and because of its similarity, I will refer to her theoretical framework as poststructuralist.  
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  Accusations of “fag” as they are articulated in this study do not in effect refer to sexual practices; 
instead they mark a boy as unmanly, not homosexual.  Indeed, most of the boys admit they would never 
call a guy they actually thought was gay a “fag” because it would be “mean”.  Curiously, demonstrating 
one‟s distance from the label of “fag” is possible by mocking an exaggerated femininity (“doing fag”), 
and then immediately resuming masculinity after this performance. This allows Pascoe to frame “fag” as 
a fluid identity, one in which boys can move in and out of, assuring themselves and others that they have 
knowledge of this label and that it does not fit. 
  The physical passivity and submission involved in the act of being penetrated49  places it outside 
of the realm of possibility for an active, aggressive, powerful subject. Penetrated masculinity (the “fag” 
epithet) is then, a contradiction in terms, (because masculinity acts, it is not acted upon); it is the absence 
of aggressive action involved in the pursuit of sexual activity (subjectivity).  “It is precisely this specter of 
penetrated masculinity that functions as a regulatory mechanism of gender for contemporary American 
adolescent boys” (Pascoe, 2005:329).  
 Drawing on Derrida‟s notion of the constitutive outside (1997 [1974]), Pascoe effectively locates 
the “fag” as a discursive struggle – in that boys actively create the masculine subject position for 
themselves by defining and rejecting that which is non-masculine (the fag).  Pascoe then is able to apply 
poststructuralism to the “fag” as “an abject position, a position outside of masculinity that actually 
constitutes masculinity” (2005:342).  The “fag” then, is the discursively produced “other” that constitutes 
the rejected space necessary to define the “subject” (here, heteronormative/hegemonic masculinity).  As 
she asserts, homophobia is essential to the making of contemporary adolescent masculinity.   
To refine and correct her analysis a bit, it is not so much homophobia that constitutes adolescent 
masculinity as it is the radical and violent denigration of the feminine (“fags” are not laughable because 
they sexually desire other men; instead, “fags” are laughable because they are feminine males – a 
discursive contradiction).  It is  masculinity itself that requires projecting the fundamental hatred of the 
feminine toward only male bodies (“fags”), leaving intact the possibility of heterosexual relationships 
where the hatred of the feminine on female bodies is able to play out unannounced (in order for 
masculinity to construct and privilege itself, it must render hateful and abject all femininity).  
 Although Pascoe highlights the discursive struggle instead of the gendered practices, even she 
admits that “Engaging in very public practices of heterosexuality, boys affirm much more than just 
                                                          
49 With her research regarding the medical interventions forced upon intersexed infants, Suzanne Kessler (2009) provides 
evidence that the medical definition of maleness is a penis with the ability to penetrate.  Intersexed infants with large enough 
penises capable of penetration have their female anatomy removed and are raised as male.  Similarly, the medical definition of 
femaleness is the ability to be penetrated. Therefore, intersexed infants with a smaller then acceptable penis size (also described 
as larger than normal clitoris), will undergo surgery to construct a penetrable vagina and all male anatomy (including the 
“penoclitoris”) will be removed (2009:72). 
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masculinity; they affirm subjecthood and personhood through sexualized interactions in which they 
indicate they have the ability to work their will upon the world around them.  Imposing one‟s will and 
demonstrating dominance aligns boys with personhood and subjectivity, historically coded as masculine” 
(Pascoe, 2007:86 emphasis added).  In high school parlance, the rituals of “getting girls” function to 
cement for boys each other‟s masculinity (while effectively removing the threat of homosexuality) and it 
allowed them to demonstrate control over what girls did with their bodies.  In this sense they were able to 
articulate subjectivity by linking themselves not merely to action, but to dominance.  Because the 
controlling of girls bodies relies on the threat of sexualized violence, “girls bodies, in this sense, became 
the conduit through which boys established themselves as masculine” (Pascoe, 2007:104).  Masculinity 
then, is not only the domination of women; it is a constitutive component of agency (subjectivity).   
Because these are practices that must be read and interpreted by others, “fag” cannot be only a discursive 
struggle but a powerful stigmatizing label given to boys who do not engage in practices that are viewed by 
others as sufficiently masculine.   
In a related study that weaves sexual practices with the intersections of race, class, gender, and 
heterosexuality, Ward (2008) offers her article, “Dude Sex: White Masculinities and „Authentic‟ 
Heterosexuality among Dudes Who Have Sex with Dudes”.  In this work she presents an interesting 
example of how men are able to construct masculinity by relying on the denigration of femininity even 
where women are absent.  She provides an analysis of ads placed on the “Casual Encounters” section of 
Craigslist-Los Angeles over a period of three months.  “Casual Encounters” is an online community 
bulletin board in which predominantly white men solicit sex from other white men; it is distinguishable 
from the openly gay “Men Seeking Men” section in that most ads on “Casual Encounters” appropriate the 
trappings of white heterosexual masculinity.  The men who place these ads correctly perceive their 
exclusion from heteronormativity and draw on other aspects of their positionality to reclaim the subject 
position.  In this way, the distinctively “queer” practice of men soliciting other men for sex is not 
necessarily understood as existing on the queer side of the heteronormative binary.  With references to 
watching straight porn, denigrating women, drinking beer, “hanging out” and referring to themselves as 
“normal” and “not into gay men”, these men are able to make a claim to heteroerotic culture while 
soliciting sex from other men.  The author points to the locally-specific nature of the white heterosexual 
masculinity that is referenced in the description of the type of guy they are looking to “hang out with”– 
frat dudes, skaters, surfers, and jocks are all recognizable lifestyles common to Southern California.  
Ward documents here references to not only gendered and sexualized practices, but to racialized and 
classed practices as well (frat dudes, skaters, etc. are emblematic categories of not just “straight men” in 
general, but “straight white middle-class men” in particular).   
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This language benefits from the conflation of whiteness and normality or the racist assumption 
that whiteness is de-racialized or “normal” as in – “I am looking for a regular dude”.  In this sense, white 
archetypes are used to support an “authentic” (read hegemonic) masculinity, especially important to men 
seeking to maintain a foothold in heteropatriarchal privilege (that confers financial and cultural power to 
straight, white, middle-class men) while placing themselves in a vulnerable context where this 
authenticity is understood to be in question (in the context of seeking sex with other men) (Ward, 2008).  
Great pains are taken to create a racist, sexist, and homophobic space in order to “maintain the 
heteroeroticism of dude-sex” (Ward, 2008:425).  She explains her findings in reference to 
intersectionality theory in that sexuality is always articulated at the intersection of race, class, and gender.  
She observed the men in her study drawing on their race and gender privilege (and sometimes class) in 
order to re-frame their “abnormal sex” (within the heterosexual/homosexual binary) as non-deviant.   
In the way of a conclusion, Ward offers the logic that “straight” and “queer” are not marked by 
sexual practices or identities, but by “cultural practices and interpretive frames” (Ward, 2008:417).  This 
study cleverly documents how intragender sexual behavior among men can be interpreted as heterosexual, 
appropriating a framework that produces their own marginality.  Although these men do reinforce the 
binary that marginalizes their sexual practices, they do so by upholding the gender and race binaries that 
create their privilege.  While they have been “othered” on one dimension of their identity, they have 
recourse to “othering” alternate categories of people in order to re-establish a claim to subjectivity (which 
is in essence, masculinity, as has been shown).  By privileging “cultural practices and interpretive 
frames”, the author is demonstrating the power within the domain of ideology and discourse as these men 
seek to deliberately suppress the importance of the sexual practices that pathologize them by offering an 
alternate framework.  In this way, Ward highlights the interpretive dimensions of discourse which occurs 
within social interaction and must be read by others.  In this case, men focus on their heterosexual white, 
middle-class male gendered practices of watching straight porn, drinking beer, belonging to a fraternity, 
surfing, etc. in order to reduce the implications of their actual homosexual sexual practices of seeking sex 
with other men.   
In the various studies cited above, we have seen that discourse cannot be understood to exist 
entirely within the abstracted realm of ideas; instead, as has been shown, discourse must be interpreted in 
interaction, established by physical practices, or else in some other way rendered concrete by the social 
moment of interpretation to establish meaning.  Following the “new” materialist thought of Smith and 
Bourdieu, practices, social interactions, and physical comportment are materialist in the sense that they 
reproduce (and resist) the social structure.  Interacting between the abstract realm of ideas and the 
concrete realm of material, a focus on social practices provides a critique of poststructuralist theory that 
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privileges ideas, language, and the symbolic as the fundamental source of what lends meaning to our 
lives.  Cultural practices are broadly defined to include the interpretive, interactional and social 
dimensions of lending concrete meaning to abstracted concepts.  The social structure then is 
accomplished (reproduced, reinforced, and resisted) through these practices. 
 
Conclusion 
The Possibility of Women in the Subject Position 
 Poststructuralist theory has arguably ushered in a new paradigm for feminist work.  This 
analytical framework has brought attention to the workings of discourse and language that has provided at 
least the possibility of alternate arrangements of concepts and alternate claims to speech.  If we accept the 
poststructuralist notion of discursively produced subjects then we must do the work of deconstructing 
binary oppositions to make sense of the subjectivities that racist, sexist, homophobic, classist, and 
imperialist discourses have provided in order to at least propose a new formulation of subjectivity. 
The power inherent in the deconstruction of the ways in which we are allowed to think, speak, and write 
cannot be overstated.  In a unique way, deconstruction allows us to transcend our (imperfectly and 
incompletely) discursively produced subjectivities in the very act of imagining a different alignment of 
terms and, therefore, the possibility of a different subjectivity. 
 The concept of subjectivity as social agency through everyday practices is appealing because it 
requires an acknowledgement of the significance of gendered habitus.  In an important way, this concept 
of subjectivity brings theory back to the realm of living bodies that must act within and are acted upon by 
given social structural restraints that injure, exploit, misrecognize and maldistribute.  This is another way 
to propose the interpretive or interactional or social dimension with the realm of 
discourses/representations/language.  That is, this definition of subjectivity bridges the embodied 
individual engaging in social practices within the realm of ideas and representations. 
 Indeed the notion of subjectivity is imaginable in both the discursive and the material realms: in 
language (subjectivity is reclaiming words used against us, creating a new language, new forms of 
speech), and in practices (subjectivity is relational; it occurs in interaction, it requires interpretation and 
context).  If women can speak and are not wholly determined by discourse as I have sought to 
demonstrate, then both domains (discursive and material) are places of possibility to articulate an 
alternate or newly found subjectivity for culturally recognizable women as I have defined this phrase.  
These domains are places of possibility for a culturally recognizable female subject exactly where they 
intersect, at a woman‟s feminine body comportment, precisely because this makes each domain 
accountable to the other. 
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 Following poststructuralism, my definition of subjectivity, as articulated in my introduction is in 
effect the forms and expressions of dominance.  To restate, the poststructuralist notion of subjectivity 
proposes the following: first, that subjectivity is what confers authority to the subject; second, that 
subjectivity is always already masculine; third, that subjectivity is the individual‟s embodied claim to 
power.  This is problematic in that subjectivity in this framework seems to be merely the attributes of 
recognizable dominance.  If subjectivity is what authorizes the subject, and it is the subject‟s embodied 
claim to power and it is always already masculine, then female subjectivity must be organized around a 
different alignment of terms, as poststructuralism demonstrates is possible.  
 An alternate definition of subjectivity as social agency articulated through everyday practices 
seems much more useful here as this alternative avoids the poststructuralist subject/object dilemma of 
each one constituting the other.  Defined in this way, social agency disentangles this mutually constitutive 
dilemma; it does not require an “object” to constitute itself.  Poststructuralism focuses on the construction 
of difference in a way that de-emphasizes the concrete practices of dominance, which results in an 
abstracted discussion of difference in language around privileged and subordinated terms.  “Othered” 
“objects” revolve around and constitute the subject in a way that does not allow for social agency for the 
former.  This abstracted discussion ultimately fails to account for the possibility of any kind of social 
agency or subjectivity or authorized action arising from a discursive position of subordination.  
 In contrast, materialists privilege the workings of dominance as existing before and carrying more 
theoretical significance than difference.  Indeed, difference is a material, social, and ideological 
production that exists to serve and justify dominance.  This theoretical formulation allows for the 
possibility of authorized action or subjectivity arising from oppression.  By re-defining subjectivity as 
women‟s embodied everyday practices, I have attempted to relate the abstractness of the discursive with 
the concreteness of the physical as it intersects, constitutes, and produces (but not wholly) a culturally 
intelligible woman.  Gendered practices bring theory back into conversation with social interaction, 
interpretative moments, and even historical and political context that all must be engaged to lend meaning 
to abstracted concepts like “femininity” or “subjectivity” as well as any possibility of where these terms 
might overlap.  Gendered practices are promising places for a critique of the limitations of privileging 
discourse because they incorporate actual bodies as well as social interpretations of these bodies.  
Subjectified women can arise in this context in a way that reveals the masculine bias inherent to 
“subjectivity” and its reliance on “disembodiedness and disembeddedness”.  That is, subjectified women 
are possible speaking and acting and doing from within their “embeddedness” (gendered practices) in 
such a way that requires their “embodiedness” (the acknowledgment of their claim to legitimacy and 
equal status) as specifically female.   
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 While I have maintained the importance of material relations in this thesis, I have not included 
any empirical studies or theoretical work around the exploitation of labor, the organization of capital, or 
the resultant impact on social relations.  Perhaps in presenting a critique of poststructuralism‟s over-
emphasis on discourse and representations, I have committed the same error myself.  By arguing for a 
separation between the realms of economic redistribution and symbolic recognition, I did not intend to 
downplay the effects of the former and I fear I may have failed to adequately capture the significance of 
economic relations of maldistribution.  To better account for this very real and ever-worsening effect of 
global capitalism, more research should be done around the limits to imagining an alternate possibility of 
a subjectified existence posed by the deprivation of resources.  
   Another oversight of this thesis has been my failure to adequately disentangle the practices that 
signal and construct femininity from the practices that signal and construct heterosexuality.   This 
conflation is an obvious part of my definition of femininity which, as I have defined it, embeds 
heterosexuality.  Although in the introduction I acknowledged the heterosexual (and racial and class and 
global privilege) dimension of the construction of what I believe to be “abstract” femininity, I have 
necessarily conflated the separate dimensions of gender and sexuality.  In conflating these two separate 
dimensions of privilege/penalty, my statements regarding the challenge transsexuals pose to the gender 
binary do in fact erase the workings of heteronormativity.  In turn, by claiming that some of the 
transsexuals studied reified the gender binary even from a position that is radically posed to challenge it 
(changing one‟s sex), it is unclear as to whether I meant the gender binary in terms of male/female or the 
gender binary in terms of heterosexuality/other.  Because believe the phrase “gender binary” encompasses 
both the sexual binary (male/female) and the heteronormative binary (heterosexual/other), in conflating 
these axes, my conclusions are muddied.  My intention was to focus on femininity and therefore gendered 
practices; but in failing to maintain an analytical distinction between the workings of male dominance and 
the workings of heterosexual dominance, I am unable to suggest how these different axes of dominance 
might interrelate. 
    Another topic raised in this thesis that was under-investigated has to do with the social practices 
that create knowledge production and rational thought.  For example, in the beginning of this thesis I 
discussed how the male/female; mind/body; passion/reason binaries that underlay notions of masculinity 
and femininity placed women outside of the realm of rational thought and reason.  This dimension of 
misogyny has been underexplored in this thesis.  Instead, I focused on gender practices that are physical 
and observable (body comportment, physical relationship to other things and people, inhibitions to one‟s 
physical strength, etc.).  In doing this, I have focused on the social practices that produce concrete 
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material effects (like physical violence) while ignoring the social practices that produce more symbolic or 
abstracted notions of violence (like defining academic or intellectual women as violating the norms of 
femininity, for example).  Further explorations into these more symbolic types of violence are necessary 
to illuminate more fully how the symbolic and physical dimensions of misogyny might interrelate. 
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